circuscritic
When? Never
Cost? N/A
It's like you're arguing because you like to argue, and can't admit that you're wrong. So you keep finding new ways to qualify your response in the hopes that I forget what this is even about.
Chromium is significantly more secure than Firefox Gecko on Android. That is according to the developers of probably the two most well regarded hardened Android ROMs.
One of which, Graphene, even advises completely avoiding Gecko based browsers.
Which is what I said in my original comment, well, the part about relative security.
You've also claimed that at most, a malicious android application can only harm battery life and cause network issues, which is objectively false. I'm honestly kind of confused why you even said that, but whatever.
I never said no one should use Firefox based browsers on Android, I just said they weren't as secure and that user should understand the risks associated with them.
But what I'm most confused and perplexed by, is your insistence that only high risk individuals should be concerned with using a browser that comes with, at minimum, double the attack service they're exposed to when browsing the web.
Again, that is per the GrapheneOS wiki/FAQ.
I mean, we're not talking about some hardcore and incredibly inconvenient levels of unnecessary OPSEC for the sake of OPSEC, we're talking about a browser.
Tell you what, if you post a link to your GitHub showing me the hardened Android ROM that you develop, or heavily contribute to, I would be happy to revise my opinion on your credibility versus those developers.
Right, so if Gecko based browsers can cause that kind of security concern on Graphene, what does that mean for people using Android ROMs that are not hardened, or, OEM variants that do not receive regular security updates?
Any app installed by a user that takes advantage of an active and unpatched CVE, can do all sorts of actions to compromise an entire phone, or critical parts of it. Are you saying that's not the case?
The difference between a compromised app, and a browser, is that even a "safe" Firefox install is used to browse a near infinite possibility of websites, any number of which might be running an active campaign targeting unpatched Android vulnerabilities.
It sounds like you're saying that despite Firefox Geckos significantly larger attack surface, the fact that Chromium doesn't eliminate all risk, means there's no difference.
Avoid Gecko-based browsers like Firefox as they're currently much more vulnerable to exploitation and inherently add a huge amount of attack surface. Gecko doesn't have a WebView implementation (GeckoView is not a WebView implementation), so it has to be used alongside the Chromium-based WebView rather than instead of Chromium, which means having the remote attack surface of two separate browser engines instead of only one. Firefox / Gecko also bypass or cripple a fair bit of the upstream and GrapheneOS hardening work for apps. Worst of all, Firefox does not have internal sandboxing on Android.
https://grapheneos.org/usage#web-browsing
That sounds like the exposed attack surface is a lot more than just whatever sites are running under your Firefox process.
But what do I know, I'm not a developer of security-hardened Android forks, so I just have to pick which randos on the internet I choose to believe. When the developers of DivestOS and GrapheneOS both have lengthy write-ups on why chromium base browsers are significantly more secure, I'm going to believe them because I don't have the low level technical knowledge to refute what they're saying.
No one is saying use Google's version of Chromium. There are hardened forks available, such as Mulch and Cromite.
It means that one malicious site can compromise your entire phone.
See the replies below regarding per-site process isolation.
Pretty sure I told you where you could find more information, as well as pointing out that the default browser on Graphene is a hardened Chromium browser, not Firefox Gecko.
But okay, here, I can even do that little bit of searching for you:
What is per-site process isolation?
Per-site process isolation is a powerful security feature that seeks to limit exposure of a malicious website/script abusing a security vulnerability. Firefox calls per-site process isolation Fission and is enabled by default on desktop. Fission is not yet enabled by default on Android, and when manually enabled it results in a severely degraded/broken experience. Furthermore Firefox on Android does not take advantage of Android's isolatedProcess flag for completely confining application services. Standalone Chromium based browsers strictly isolate websites to their own process.
Source: The developer of Mull, Mulch, & DivestOS
Projectivy launcher, problem ~~solved~~ adequately duct taped.
Stop connecting your TVs directly to the internet, I don't care what OS it's running. The trend is clear with TV manufacturers, and if your current TV OS doesn't yet inject ads into your streaming box's HDMI stream, why risk it updating? Because that's coming soon enough, and I imagine what it does, an update requiring your TV to have internet connection won't be far behind.
Extensions are another vector. But putting that aside, because I agree ads are a much larger threat:
Also, Mulch lets you pick your DNS provider. So even if you don't already have system, or network, wide ad blocking, it's not like you're deluged in ads.
Again, I'm not saying no one should use Gecko based browsers, I'm just repeating what developers of respected hardened security ROMs have written about. Actually, that's not true, I'm taking a softer approach as the GrapheneOS wiki/FAQ says NOT to use Gecko based browsers.