Asklemmy

Some compatibilists have argued for moral responsibility in a deterministic world (a world in which no action /a’/ could have been made at a certain time /t/ other than the executed action /a/)

Here, take this example excerpted from Fischer (2006, 38):

“Imagine, if you will, that Black is a quite nifty (and even generally nice) neurosurgeon. But in performing an operation on Jones to remove a brain tumor, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones’s brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones’s activities. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black exercises this control through a sophisticated computer which he has programmed so that, among other things, it monitors Jones’s voting behavior. If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for Bush, then the computer, through the mechanism in Jones’s brain, intervenes to ensure that he actually decides to vote for Clinton and does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton, the computer does nothing but continue to monitor—without affecting—the goings-on in Jones’s head.”

In such a scenario where there is only one objective outcome, John could have been controlled against his desire and thus would've been unfree. But if he were to deliberately vote for Clinton, then he was free and consequently morally responsible for his decision. This is an account for sourcehood, which focuses on the source of one's action and how it was brought about. Interesting theory to think about.

It is, but it also isn't. We act on the assumption of free will. But really the assumed consequences for ones actions, is obviously one of the things that elminates the control of them. Therefore whether our thoughts are free or not. we would not remove the consequences for ours and other actions because, that would remove a force preventing them from doing things which harm us.