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"We have to ask ourselves how to increase our delivery capacity," Chief Executive Roberto Cingolani told analysts during a conference call laying out the company's new five-year industrial plan.

Cingolani's comments came after European Union countries agreed last week to boost defence spending, vowing to "re-arm Europe" against the perceived threat from Russia and the risk that the United States might not stand by its NATO allies under President Donald Trump.

"We have to protect ourselves more than before, especially if the relationship with our NATO allies changes" and if Washington takes fewer steps "to protect Europe", he said.

Were Italy to boost its military spending by one percentage point from its current 1.52 percent of GDP, Leonardo's revenue would rise by between two billion to three billion euros, he said.

[...]

Defence budgets in Europe have risen following Russia's 2022 all-out invasion of Ukraine, and are set to increase further as the EU responds to Trump's demands that allies pay more for their security.

Leonardo said its net profit rose 67 percent to 1.16 billion euros in 2024. Revenues rose 16.2 percent to 17.9 billion euros, with growth in nearly every segment.

[...]

Orders last year were 16.8 percent higher than in 2023, helped by its Electronics for Defence and Security (EDS) division, and its helicopters unit.

Since 2023 when he took over the helm of the group, which is 30 percent owned by the Italian state, Cingolani has worked to build alliances with other European defence groups to compete with US and Chinese rivals.

[...]

Archived

France will not accept "any demilitarization of the Ukrainian army," French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.

[...]

"Demilitarization" and "denazification" were two insincere excuses that the Kremlin used to invade Ukraine in a war of territorial and ethnocidal aggression in February 2022.

The Ukrainian army is "the main guarantee" of Ukraine's security, Lecornu said in the opening remarks at the Paris Defence and Strategy Forum, which gathered over 30 army chiefs to discuss what Europe and the West can offer in support of Ukraine as part of a peace deal with Russia.

The French defense minister added that Europe is facing a "new period" in its history, significantly different from the Cold War and the period of "peace dividends" with several powers fighting for influence.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia demanded that Ukraine reduce its army to 50,000 personnel. Moscow also sought to ensure that Kyiv "did not develop, produce, purchase, or deploy missile weapons of any kind with a range of over 250 kilometers (156 miles) on its territory."

Ukraine has repeatedly highlighted the need for security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire in the war with Russia.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/30887912

Here is the report Security and Trust: An Unsolvable Digital Dilemma? (pdf)

Police authorities and governments are calling for digital backdoors for investigative purposes - and the EU Commission is listening. The Centre for European Policy (cep) warns against a weakening of digital encryption. The damage to cyber security, fundamental rights and trust in digital infrastructures would be enormous.

[...]

The debate has become explosive due to the current dispute between the USA and the UK. The British government is demanding that Apple provide a backdoor to the iCloud to allow investigating authorities access to encrypted data. Eckhardt sees parallels with the EU debate: "We must prevent the new security strategy from becoming a gateway for global surveillance." Technology companies such as Meta, WhatsApp and Signal are already under pressure to grant investigators access to encrypted messages.

"Once you install a backdoor, you lose control over who uses it," says Küsters. Chinese hackers were recently able to access sensitive data through a vulnerability in US telecommunications networks - a direct consequence of the infrastructure there. Instead, Küsters advocates a strategy of "security by design", i.e. designing systems securely from the outset, and the increased use of metadata analyses and platform cooperation as viable alternatives to mass surveillance.

[...]

Lessons from across the Atlantic?

A recent episode from the US provides an illustrative cautionary tale. For decades, some US law enforcement and intelligence agencies advocated “exceptional access” to encrypted communications, claiming that only criminals needed such robust privacy protections – echoing the current debate in the EU. But over the past months, a dramatic shift occurred following revelations that Chinese state-sponsored hackers had infiltrated major US telecommunications networks, gaining access to call metadata and possibly even live calls (the so-called “Salt Typhoon” hack).

Specifically, the Chinese hackers exploited systems that US telecom companies had built to comply with federal wiretapping laws such as Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires telecommunications firms to enable “lawful intercepts”. In theory, these built-in channels were supposed to only give law enforcement an exclusive window into suspect communications. In practice, however, they became a universal vulnerability that hostile actors could just as easily exploit.

Suddenly, the very government voices that once dismissed end-to-end encryption began recommending that citizens use encrypted messaging apps to maintain their security.

**What can we learn from this? **

While governments often push for greater surveillance capabilities, the real and current threat of state-sponsored cyber-espionage demonstrates the indispensable value of strong encryption. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, Salt Typhoon shows once more that there is no such thing as a backdoor that only the “good guys” can use.

If the mechanism exists, a malicious party will eventually find it and weaponise it. The lesson for Europe is clear: undermining encryption to aid investigations may prove short-sighted if it also exposes citizens – and state institutions – to hostile foreign interference. Is this really what we want to do in an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment? The debate about ensuring lawful and effective access to data in the digital age will remain one of the most pressing challenges, so we need to ask whether there are alternative, viable models.

[...]

Here is the report Security and Trust: An Unsolvable Digital Dilemma? (pdf)

Police authorities and governments are calling for digital backdoors for investigative purposes - and the EU Commission is listening. The Centre for European Policy (cep) warns against a weakening of digital encryption. The damage to cyber security, fundamental rights and trust in digital infrastructures would be enormous.

[...]

The debate has become explosive due to the current dispute between the USA and the UK. The British government is demanding that Apple provide a backdoor to the iCloud to allow investigating authorities access to encrypted data. Eckhardt sees parallels with the EU debate: "We must prevent the new security strategy from becoming a gateway for global surveillance." Technology companies such as Meta, WhatsApp and Signal are already under pressure to grant investigators access to encrypted messages.

"Once you install a backdoor, you lose control over who uses it," says Küsters. Chinese hackers were recently able to access sensitive data through a vulnerability in US telecommunications networks - a direct consequence of the infrastructure there. Instead, Küsters advocates a strategy of "security by design", i.e. designing systems securely from the outset, and the increased use of metadata analyses and platform cooperation as viable alternatives to mass surveillance.

[...]

Lessons from across the Atlantic?

A recent episode from the US provides an illustrative cautionary tale. For decades, some US law enforcement and intelligence agencies advocated “exceptional access” to encrypted communications, claiming that only criminals needed such robust privacy protections – echoing the current debate in the EU. But over the past months, a dramatic shift occurred following revelations that Chinese state-sponsored hackers had infiltrated major US telecommunications networks, gaining access to call metadata and possibly even live calls (the so-called “Salt Typhoon” hack).

Specifically, the Chinese hackers exploited systems that US telecom companies had built to comply with federal wiretapping laws such as Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires telecommunications firms to enable “lawful intercepts”. In theory, these built-in channels were supposed to only give law enforcement an exclusive window into suspect communications. In practice, however, they became a universal vulnerability that hostile actors could just as easily exploit.

Suddenly, the very government voices that once dismissed end-to-end encryption began recommending that citizens use encrypted messaging apps to maintain their security.

**What can we learn from this? **

While governments often push for greater surveillance capabilities, the real and current threat of state-sponsored cyber-espionage demonstrates the indispensable value of strong encryption. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, Salt Typhoon shows once more that there is no such thing as a backdoor that only the “good guys” can use.

If the mechanism exists, a malicious party will eventually find it and weaponise it. The lesson for Europe is clear: undermining encryption to aid investigations may prove short-sighted if it also exposes citizens – and state institutions – to hostile foreign interference. Is this really what we want to do in an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment? The debate about ensuring lawful and effective access to data in the digital age will remain one of the most pressing challenges, so we need to ask whether there are alternative, viable models.

[...]

The global security landscape has undergone profound changes in recent years, characterized by the rise of revisionist powers and the weakening of the rules-based international order. Two regions stand at the forefront of these challenges: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), confronting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific, where China’s assertive actions continue to raise tensions well beyond the Taiwan Strait.

Despite their geographic distance, CEE and the Indo-Pacific thus face similar economic, political and security challenges, especially when it comes to their authoritarian neighbors. As regional conflicts become increasingly interconnected, the war in Ukraine offers critical lessons not just for Taiwan but for the broader Indo-Pacific region.

The Sino-Russian Partnership

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China has attempted to position itself as a neutral power promoting peace and stability. However, its actions tell a different story. Beyond the infamous Xi-Putin meeting that established the “no limits” partnership just weeks before Russia’s invasion,** China has effectively sustained Russia’s war efforts through financial collaboration, technology transfers, and the circumvention of international sanctions**. Among these forms of bilateral support, the transfer of dual-use technology and components has been flagged as particularly concerning.

Moreover, Beijing has advanced peace proposals that largely mirror Russian positions while criticizing Western peace initiatives.

[...]

In contrast to Beijing’s ambiguity [...] Japan swiftly provided unconditional support for Ukraine, even at significant costs to its own national interests, including energy cooperation with Moscow.

South Korea initially adopted a more cautious approach, balancing its support for Ukraine against regional security concerns. However, North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia’s war efforts in late 2024 prompted Seoul to reassess its position. With Russia and North Korea forming an increasingly entrenched authoritarian alliance, South Korea has drawn closer to Western partners to counter this emerging threat.

[...]

For Central and Eastern European states, particularly those most threatened by Russia’s actions – i.e., Poland, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic – China’s stance on Ukraine has fundamentally altered their approach to Beijing.

[...]

This reflects a broader shift in Central and Eastern Europe, where initial enthusiasm for Chinese investment has largely given way to disillusionment due to unfulfilled economic promises. The cooperation platform between China and CEE (originally known as the 16+1) now functions as a “zombie format,” especially since the withdrawal of the Baltic states. As China’s role in CEE diminishes due to its tacit support for Russia’s aggression and regional cohesion fractures, China has prioritized bilateral relations with countries like Hungary [...]

[...]

CEE states have also embraced more constructive engagement with other Indo-Pacific countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan [...] Indeed, Taiwan has found vocal allies in the CEE region, with the Czech Senate President Vystrčil’s high-profile visit to Taiwan in 2020 exemplifying these deepening ties. Most recently, Taiwan’s major semiconductor company – TSMC – has begun constructing a semiconductor production facility in Germany, with the Czech Republic and other Visegrád Four (V4) states expected to play vital roles as component suppliers.

[...]

Ukraine and Taiwan share several concerning similarities. Both face revisionist powers that contest their sovereignty based on distorted historical narratives. The long-held neoliberal assumption that economic interdependence deters military aggression has proven flawed in Ukraine and may similarly fail when it comes to Taiwan, where the global economic consequences would be even more severe.

[...]

Archived

NATO state and member of the Arctic Council, Norway has raised alarm over the steadily rising Chinese presence in the High North, quipping that China’s influence in the region is currently “limited but growing,” as it works more closely with ally Russia, as highlighted by a latest Newsweek report.

It cited the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) annual threat assessment report published in February 2025, which particularly highlights China’s threat and the growing collaboration between China and Russia in the Arctic.

In fact, NIS reports have consistently named these two countries as threats during the last few years. However, the dangers have now become more pronounced.

The 2025 threat assessment states: “China has ambitions to strengthen its presence, capabilities and influence in the Arctic in the coming years. China is facilitating this by strengthening cooperation with Russia on research and commercial activities, as well as by increasing China’s national icebreaker capacity.”

[...]

The Norwegian Intelligence states that China’s investments in Russian liquefied natural gas projects are its “largest and most prominent” Arctic-related activity. However, it also warns that Russia might entice South Africa, India, and Brazil to join its Arctic energy initiatives.

For instance, reports indicate that Russia’s largest producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is scouring international markets to find buyers for gas from its sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project. It has reportedly set its sights on India, a strategic partner.

The threat assessment report also states that China is focusing on building larger icebreakers and icebreakers with nuclear propulsion, which will improve its capability to map the Arctic for both military and civilian uses. This may not come as a surprise given that last year, China made an unprecedented move by deploying three icebreakers to the Arctic, including its most advanced vessel, Xue Long 2.

For China, the Arctic holds strategic, economic, and environmental significance. Experts warn that the increase in Chinese activity in the region is based on exercising rights related to scientific research, freedom of navigation and overflight, fishery activities, cable and pipeline laying, and resource exploitation in the region. However, they go beyond and often have dual purposes.

In 2023, for instance, China placed acoustic listening buoys in the North Sea and ramped up its research activities in Ny-Ålesund [a small town in Oscar II Land in the west of the island of Spitsbergen].

[...]

The proposed law text is posted on the Vkontakte page of a church in Severodvinsk. Churches in Novodvinsk and Arkhangelsk are also collecting signatures aimed at the regional assembly to take action and adopt a new anti-abortion law.

It should not be allowed to propagate abortion, and it should not be allowed to assist with termination of pregnancy anywhere in the Arkhangelsk region, the proposed law text suggest.

In social media, the church has posted a banner of an unborn baby side-by-side with a young child dressed up in combat uniform:

"Protect me today, I can protect you tomorrow. Abortion is murder," the text reads.

Russia’s intensified campaigns against abortion follows Vladimir Putin’s decision to declare 2024 “the Year of the Family.”

[...]

A former senior Facebook executive has told the BBC how the social media giant worked "hand in glove" with the Chinese government on potential ways of allowing Beijing to censor and control content in China.

Sarah Wynn-Williams - a former global public policy director - says in return for gaining access to the Chinese market of hundreds of millions of users, Facebook's founder, Mark Zuckerberg, considered agreeing to hiding posts that were going viral, until they could be checked by the Chinese authorities.

Ms Williams - who makes the claims in a new book - has also filed a whistleblower complaint with the US markets regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), alleging Meta misled investors. The BBC has reviewed the complaint.

Facebook's parent company Meta, says Ms Wynn-Williams had her employment terminated in 2017 "for poor performance".

It is "no secret we were once interested" in operating services in China, it adds. "We ultimately opted not to go through with the ideas we'd explored."

[...]

Ms Wynn-Williams says her allegations about the company's close relationship with China provide an insight into Facebook's decision-making at the time.

[...]

Ms Wynn-Williams claims that in the mid-2010s, as part of its negotiations with the Chinese government, Facebook considered allowing it future access to Chinese citizens' user data.

"He was working hand in glove with the Chinese Communist Party, building a censorship tool… basically working to develop sort of the antithesis of many of the principles that underpin Facebook," she told the BBC.

Ms Wynn-Williams says governments frequently asked for explanations of how aspects of Facebook's software worked, but were told it was proprietary information.

"But when it came to the Chinese, the curtain was pulled back," she says.

"Engineers were brought out. They were walked through every aspect, and Facebook was making sure these Chinese officials were upskilled enough that they could not only learn about these products, but then test Facebook on the censorship version of these products that they were building."

[...]

In her SEC complaint, Ms Wynn-Williams also alleges Mr Zuckerberg and other Meta executives had made "misleading statements… in response to Congressional inquiries" about China.

One answer given by Mr Zuckerberg to Congress in 2018 said Facebook was "not in a position to know exactly how the [Chinese] government would seek to apply its laws and regulations on content"

[...]

As of this year, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) - [which plays a crucial role in sustainable development with over 7,300 projects across three continents] - will start implementing its updated Environmental and Social Policy and Access to Information Policy. These policies set the EBRD’s environmental, social, and human rights standards, as well as obligations for its public and private sector clients. Feedback from civil society organisations like Bankwatch, project-affected communities, and institutions such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has led to significant improvements in transparency, stakeholder engagement, and human rights due diligence. However, accountability gaps remain.

One of the most significant improvements is the EBRD’s commitment to greater transparency. The EBRD will now proactively disclose environmental and social information, reducing barriers for stakeholders seeking access. Additionally, it has introduced a public interest override to prioritise transparency over non-disclosure commitments when necessary.

[...]

In the past, public transport projects in Sarajevo and Tbilisi lacked transparency, excluding citizens from decision-making. [...] As a result, concerns raised by women and other vulnerable groups regarding routes, security, and accessibility were overlooked. The new transparency commitments should help prevent such oversights.

[...]

The new policies require financial intermediary banks to establish grievance mechanisms, disclose their environmental and social management systems, and report on implementation. This is a step forward, but it remains unclear how affected individuals will be informed of their rights and access to the EBRD accountability mechanisms when needed.

[...]

Another improvement is a new EBRD commitment to disclose the amounts and sources of technical assistance funding and grant financing. It also lowers the threshold for publishing project summaries for grant-funded activities not tied to specific projects. However, without a requirement to disclose outcomes, accountability remains weak, especially for public-sector initiatives.

For example, in the Karaganda WWTP Modernisation project in Kazakhstan, the EBRD allocated over EUR 1 million in technical assistance for a feasibility study and environmental and social impact assessment. Civil society groups raised concerns that the proposed plant might not meet the growing population’s needs or address water losses from outdated infrastructure. However, a lack of public access to the feasibility study undermined consultation efforts and limited the project’s potential benefits for essential infrastructure development.

[...]

For the first time, the EBRD has formally recognised human rights as a core element of project assessment and management. The updated Environmental and Social Policy requires projects to factor in governance risks, civic space restrictions, and stakeholder concerns, ensuring a more context-specific approach to risk management.

For instance, the EBRD will now have to consider risks posed by laws restricting civil society in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, the criminalisation of LGBTIQ+ people in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, media censorship in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and the absence of civil liberties in Egypt and Turkey. These risks should inform project categorisation, impact assessments, mitigation measures, and monitoring and accountability frameworks.

Another notable step forward is the EBRD’s commitment to assessing retaliation risks and working with clients to prevent reprisals against project-affected people, a provision that the Environmental and Social Policy had previously overlooked. It now introduces requirements for clients to develop relevant policies and ensure stakeholder engagement is free from harassment and reprisals. However, given that the clients themselves are often responsible for these acts of retaliation, the EBRD must first and foremost strengthen its own due diligence processes to hold clients accountable whenever these risks arise.

[...]

Additionally, the Environmental and Social Policy mandates assessments of digitalisation risks and supply-chain impacts, which are particularly relevant given the EBRD’s focus on green investment. The policy’s commitment to using sex-disaggregated data to capture gender-specific impacts is another welcome development.

[...]

Civil society has long criticised the EBRD’s reliance on client-provided information and its consistent lack of independent verification. The new policy requires the EBRD to integrate stakeholder perspectives into risk assessments and enhance external validation of reported data.

For projects with significant community impacts, the EBRD may now conduct its own stakeholder consultations before approval, adding a layer of accountability. However, simply considering the views of stakeholders is not enough. The EBRD must also proactively seek out their opinions, particularly in countries with democratic deficits. For instance, the problematic Amulsar gold mine and Indorama Agro cotton projects, both backed by the EBRD, show how things can go badly wrong when the views of stakeholders are ignored and the early warnings of civil society organisations are not heeded.

[...]

Additionally, the new requirement for trade union consultations means the EBRD must foster an environment where independent workers’ organisations can thrive without undue influence from the client. As a case in point, the replacement of a democratically elected union with a less representative coalition on the Indorama Agro project in Uzbekistan illustrates the risks of failing to ensure these enabling conditions are met.

[...]

More than 360 civil society organisations and trade unions demand that in the upcoming legislative negotiations, the Omnibus proposal is revised to ensure that any amendments seeking to weaken corporate accountability, human rights and environmental protection are rejected.

Here is the full Joint Statement (pdf)

The key weaknesses:

• Civil liability will to a much larger extent be left to EU Member States’ discretion, with the potential of drastically reducing access to justice for victims in front of EU courts.
• Companies will only be required to assess harms attributable to direct business partners, which reduces drastically the value chain.
• There is no longer an obligation to “put […] into effect” Climate Transition Plans, which would introduce a dangerous loophole, allowing companies to comply with the provision, in theory, by simply producing a plan on paper, rather than putting it into action.
• EU Member States would no longer be able to establish more ambitious rules than the directive.
• Companies will no longer have to terminate contracts (even in cases where it is possible or likely that abuses continue).
• Stakeholder engagement will be reduced to those “directly” affected.
• The frequency of monitoring the effectiveness of due diligence measures is reduced from every year to every 5 years.
• Removal of the minimum cap on sanctions of 5% of the turnover.
• The Commission is no longer obliged to examine the necessity to apply due diligence rules.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/30751424

Archived

[...]

There is certainly bipartisan agreement in the US that East Asia is now the key theatre for US grand strategy, and that China’s global ambitions and growing military prowess pose a pacing threat to the US and its democratic allies and partners.

[...]

But the reality is that the European and Indo-Pacific fronts are intricately linked as long as Russia and China support each other and their interests are aligned. Countering one adversary will require addressing the influence of the other.

[...]

The partnership has been material and substantial: China has provided assistance to Russia’s war machine, geospatial intelligence for its military, markets for its natural resources and sanctioned companies, and backing at the United Nations.

[...]

Both countries echo each other’s propaganda, and their massive media and covert disinformation apparatuses amplify each other’s messaging.

[...]

A Russian victory would be an immense victory for China as well. It would shatter the image of a strong and unified west, show NATO to be a paper tiger and sow doubt throughout the world about the value of US security guarantees. These are all goals that Beijing has pursued for decades, and that are key to the revisionist world order Beijing hopes to craft.

A Russian win in Ukraine, moreover, would create a clear precedent for one of [Chinese leader] Xi’s most important goals—taking Taiwan. That’s why the Taiwanese government, which has more to lose than anyone else in the Indo-Pacific region, has for three years loudly cheered US support for Ukraine.

[...]

If the war in Ukraine ends on terms favourable to Russia, both China and Russia will be free to concentrate more of their joint efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of a cautious China and a distracted Russia in the eastern theatre, the US will have to deal with an emboldened China and a vindicated Russia—even as US allies and partners in the region view the US with newfound skepticism. If the US at some point calls on Europe for assistance in East Asia, few would expect them to heed that call.

Archived

The Italian government approved a draft law that for the first time introduces the legal definition of femicide in the country’s criminal law and punishes it with life imprisonment.

The move, announced on the eve of International Women’s Day on Saturday, aims at tackling a shocking string of killings and violence targeting women in Italy through strengthening measures against gender-based crimes like stalking and revenge porn.

The proposal, agreed on late Friday, still needs to go through parliament and must be approved by both chambers to become law.

“This is an extremely significant bill, which introduces the crime of femicide in our legal system as an autonomous crime, punishing it with life imprisonment,” said conservative Premier Giorgia Meloni, who strongly backed the initiative.

“It introduces aggravating circumstances and increases sentences for crimes including personal mistreatment, stalking, sexual violence and revenge porn,” she said in a statement.

[...]