China

• Chinese citizens' seemingly popular attitudes toward their government as party propaganda gained in direct surveys -and covered by China Central Television, Xinhua, China Global Television Network, China Dailyand other state-controlled outlets- provide a false narrative as survey respondents conceal their opposition to the regime due to the threat of repression.
• Deeper analyses find that Chinese citizens are far more fearful of expressing opposition to the regime under its leader Xi Jinping than in other autocracies, suggesting that observers should be sceptical about public opinion surveys in China that rely on direct questioning.
• The [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s sprawling internal security apparatus compels citizens to engage in widespread self-censorship, at a rate nearly three times higher than in Vladamir Putin’s Russia.
• Researcher say the CCP confronts widespread frustration. Its recent policies, including the increase in repression and sabre-rattling over Taiwan, should be seen as an effort to contain this frustration.

[Edit typo.]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4157529

James Robinson, along with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, has been awarded this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics for his research on the critical role institutions play in fostering national prosperity. In [this Q&A session]l with EL PAÍS, he explains that his work also seeks to highlight how the legacy of colonialism has impeded economic development in certain regions, particularly in Latin America and Africa.

James Robinson: [...] we make a simple division, focusing on the presence of inclusive institutions or extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions create broad incentives and opportunities for all people equally, while extractive institutions concentrate benefits and incentives in the hands of a few. Many economists say that development comes from entrepreneurship and innovation, but in reality it comes from people’s dreams, creativity and aspirations. To be prosperous, you have to create a series of institutions that can cultivate this talent. However, if you look at countries like Colombia or Nigeria, talent is wasted because people do not have opportunities.

[...]

Institutions can be an obstacle to competitiveness. However, one should consider the impact that European integration had on countries such as Spain, Portugal or the former Soviet countries. These are remarkable success stories. There has been an almost unprecedented transition. It is true that there may be too much regulation or inefficient rules, but broadly speaking the effects of European institutions has been largely positive over the past 50 years.

[...]

[Immigration] is one of the big questions we have to solve. [...] it can be difficult. It is not easy to quickly incorporate the millions of people who cross the Mediterranean [trying to reach Europe]. One of the possible ways is to help them develop in order to improve the terrible situation in their own countries. However, one of the biggest complications is that the policies recommended by Western institutions are not in tune with what is happening in these [developing] countries. At the World Bank, for example, you cannot talk about politics. How do we expect them to solve real problems when you cannot talk about them? Frankly, it doesn’t make sense. If we really want to change the world, we have to have honest conversations. I see that as a long way off.

[...]

The reality is that democratic countries have shown that they are better at managing public services and achieving rapid growth. You can find impressive examples like China among autocratic countries, but you cannot achieve an inclusive economy with an authoritarian regime and a model like the Chinese one.

[...]

I don’t think the Chinese model can continue. If you look at other authoritarian regimes, like Iran or Russia, they are incredibly weak economically and technologically. The economy cannot flourish in an authoritarian regime. Right now, technological dynamism is concentrated in one such country and in the Western world. However, one has to consider that, with Donald Trump, the institutions that have made the United States great are being seriously questioned. This could affect the context, and that is why the European Union and NATO are so important.

[...]

[Populism is linked to the growing disconnect between governments and citizens] and an example of this is Latin America. Democracy promised too much and did not always deliver. People’s lives did not change, and they sought new alternatives. There are various factors why democracy has not achieved transformations, such as clientelism and corruption. [...] Venezuela was governed in a deeply corrupt manner, and Hugo Chávez was clever in taking advantage of it. You also see this with Donald Trump, who has gone far because he realized there was widespread dissatisfaction with traditional politics. The failures of democratic institutions are real, and that is why we have to think about how to make them more empathetic to what people need.

[...]

Artificial intelligence can be wonderful, but like all technologies, it depends on how it is used. If artificial intelligence is used to create replacements for humans, that could be devastating. [...] It is all about how it is used, and that depends on our governments. I think that these decisions should not be left to the tech gurus. They only think about what makes them the most money, even if this is not related to the general well-being of society. In the case of artificial intelligence, it is very important, because it could have a tectonic impact on the world.

Original article is behind a paywall.

Recently, as Chinese authorities have strengthened overall social control, oppression of academia has reportedly become more severe. Not only are scholars expelled, but there are even cases of disappearance.

According to the FT, Huwei, Communist Party's Shanghai City Party professor, was forced to retire early after criticizing Russia's full-scale invasion most prominently.

[He] sparked a fierce debate within China shortly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, arguing that China should cut ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as possible. This was contrary to President Xi Jinping's policy of trying to get close to President Putin.

[...]

China is targeting intellectuals living not only at home but also abroad, suppressing traditionally sensitive topics such as politics as well as discussions about China's economy, which has recently been in big trouble, the FT noted.

Some scholars were detained on unknown charges and suddenly disappeared one day, and some were fired from universities or affiliated organizations. In some cases, social media accounts were canceled or other forms of administrative or legal punishment were given.

Specifically, Zhu Hengfeng (朱恒鵬), former vice president of the Economic Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, was detained for posting on WeChat (微 Trust, Chinese version of Kakao Talk). Chinese media recently reported that former Vice President Zhu was recently severely punished for "absurd remarks to the party's center."

The FT also mentioned the case that Dr. Wu Chang (吳强), who worked as a political science lecturer at Tsinghua University, was placed under house arrest during both sessions (the National People's Congress and the National People's Political Consultative Conference) in March this year. Neither the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences nor Tsinghua University responded to the FT's request for comment.

In recent years, Chinese scholars working in Japan are known to be particularly targeted. 范 濤, a political science professor at Japan's Asian University, disappeared last year on his way back to his hometown of Shanghai. Professor 胡 of Kobe Gakuin University, Japan, also went missing during a trip to China last year.

[...]

Renowned Uyghur folklorist Rahile Daute disappeared in 2017, and it was reported in September last year that he was sentenced to life in prison through a secret trial.

"During former President Mao Zedong's rule, China strictly controlled professors' working conditions and children's schools," said Perry Link, a professor at Princeton University.

[...]

According to China's National Bureau of Statistics on the 21st, the unemployment rate of young people (16-24 years old) reached 18.8% in August. It's the highest it's been this year. This is attributed to the fact that a large number of students who graduated from school in the first half of this year jumped into the job front.

[...]

Chinese authorities temporarily suspended the release of monthly figures after youth unemployment hit an all-time high of 21.3% in June last year. Since then, new standards have been applied and announced from this year excluding enrolled students from the statistical target. Nevertheless, the youth unemployment rate, which was 14.6% in January this year, is steadily rising.

Last month, the story of 24-year-old Lee became a hot topic on Weibo, a Chinese social network service (SNS). After completing a master's degree in physics at the graduate school, it was known that he got a job as a cleaner at a high school in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province.

[...]

In fact, many young Chinese people are flocking to gig workers (short-time workers). The number of delivery drivers registered on Meituan, a large delivery platform, jumped from 3.98 million in 2019 to 7.45 million last year. The growth of the delivery market slowed due to the end of the "COVID-19 lockdown" policy, but the number of delivery drivers increased.

[...]

Against this backdrop, the Chinese government has recently decided to strengthen its crackdown on slang and newly coined words on the Internet. Some analysts say that they intend to censor terms that criticize the Chinese Communist Party and the government.

Chinese authorities have forcibly detained four Tibetan students, aged 15 to 18, for refusing to attend a state-run boarding school following the closure of the Buddhist primary school at Taktsang Lhamo Kirti Monastery in Dzoge County, according to a report by Radio Free Asia. The students have been subjected to “political education” as part of the government’s efforts to enforce attendance at state-run institutions.

The Taktsang Lhamo Kirti Monastery School was shut down on October 1, coinciding with China’s National Day celebrations. On October 2, authorities forced more than 200 students, aged 15 to 18, to attend state-run schools in Dzoge County as part of China’s compulsory education policy, marking the complete closure of the monastery school. Starting in July, over 300 younger students, aged 6 to 14, had already been forcibly transferred to various state-run schools in the county.

[...]

The forcibly enrolled young monks are being educated primarily through Chinese textbooks. However, they are also receiving separate political education sessions focused on Chinese politics and ‘Xi Jinping’s Thought,’ according to an anonymous source inside Tibet.

[...]

For years, posts related to events during World War Two have proliferated on the Chinese internet, with the Japanese invasion during the war remaining a sensitive topic for nationalists on both sides. In China, Japan’s wartime atrocities have long been a sore point as Beijing maintains that Tokyo has never fully apologised.

The online posts are part of a wider phenomenon, which encompasses both xenophobia and attacks on Chinese nationals for being unpatriotic. One argument by analysts is that this digital nationalism has gone mostly unchecked by the Chinese government, with online patriotism fanning flames of anti-foreigner sentiment as well as accusations against Chinese figures.

Some are asking if this has gone too far. [...]They see echoes of the violent, state-sponsored campaign against so-called enemies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that traumatised the country in the 1960 and 1970s. Hundreds of thousands died in purges often led by youth militias known as the Red Guards. Families and neighbours turned on each other.

In a recent essay, author and university professor Zhang Sheng noted that “in the past people summoned the Red Guards, now people summon the ‘little pinks’” – a popular nickname for the virtual army of online nationalists.

[...]

It is not just foreigners facing the ire of cyber-nationalists. In recent months, Chinese public figures and companies have also been castigated for being insufficiently patriotic.

Beverage giant Nongfu Spring is considered a Chinese business success story, with its mineral water bottles a ubiquitous sight across the country’s convenience stores and restaurant tables. But in March, nationalists accused the company of using Japanese elements in its product design. One of its logos was said to resemble a Shinto temple, while the iconic mineral water bottle’s red cap was deemed to be a reference to the Japanese flag.

It resulted in a brief but intense online campaign: some called for a boycott, while videos of people angrily stamping on Nongfu Spring bottles and chucking their drinks down the toilet were all over social media.

Similarly, the author and Nobel Literature Prize laureate Mo Yan was accused of “beautifying” Japanese soldiers and being unpatriotic in his works by a nationalist blogger, who controversially sued the writer for insulting China.

[...]

Even state media has accused online nationalists of “making patriotism a business”. One commentary by CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily said those who “stir up public opinion and add fuel to the flames in order to… gain traffic and make personal gains, should be severely punished”.

But the ruling party has had a hand in stoking the fire, some say.

Chinese police have detained four workers of the Taiwanese iPhone maker, Foxconn, in circumstances Taipei has described as "strange".

The employees were arrested in Zhengzhou in Henan province on "breach of trust" charges, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council said in a statement.

[...]

Taiwanese authorities suggested the detentions may be a case of "abuse of power" by Chinese police officers.

And said the case undermines the confidence of businesses operating in China.

In October last year, China's tax and land authorities launched an investigation into the company.

At that time, Foxconn's founder Terry Gou was running as an independent candidate in Taiwan's presidential election.

Taiwan has urged its citizens to "avoid non-essential travel" to the mainland as well as Hong Kong and Macau after China unveiled guidelines in June detailing criminal punishments for what Beijing described as diehard "Taiwan independence" separatists.

[...]

Archived link

The [Chinese economic] model that has powered four decades of breakneck economic growth was reliant on cheap exports and wasteful state-led investment in property and infrastructure. It is no longer sustainable. It has led to soaring debt and diminishing returns, with China littered with ghost cities, containing 60 to 100 million empty or incomplete homes, while companies accounting for 40% of China’s home sales have defaulted. It is widely agreed that China needs to rebalance its economy, that consumers need to spend more, since private consumption accounts for just 39% of the economy – extremely low by world standards (the figure in the US is 68%). But there is no consumer confidence, with 80% of family wealth tied up in property and no meaningful social safety net.

China's leader Xi Jinping hopes renewable energy tech can replace property as a new motor of growth, and mouth-watering subsidies have been thrown at industries ranging from solar panels to electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries, leading to massive over-capacity and vicious price wars. Yet the benign global environment that accompanied China’s earlier export splurges has gone; the world is much more wary, and both the US and EU have imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese EVs and solar panels they allege are being dumped at below cost.

[,,,]

China has never provided a level playing field for foreign business, but under Xi, the environment has become increasingly hostile. Last year, direct foreign investment into China fell to a 23-year-low. In Western boardrooms, once so bewitched with capturing a share of the mythical China market that they would put normally rational decision-making aside and suffer almost any indignity, ‘resilience’ has become the watchword. The Ukraine war has exposed the danger of over dependence on autocrats with hostile ambitions.

[...]

Archived version

Original version (paywalled)

The passport collection drive, carried out under what is known as “personal travel abroad management,” allows local government officials to control and monitor who can travel abroad, how often and to where.

It comes as Xi steps up state involvement in everyday life and clamps down on official corruption. China’s powerful state security apparatus has also intensified its campaign against foreign espionage.

Interviews with more than a dozen Chinese public sector workers and notices from education bureaus in half a dozen cities show restrictions on international travel have been greatly expanded from last year to include rank-and-file employees of schools, universities, local governments and state-owned groups.

[...]

“If we want to travel abroad, we have to apply to the city education bureau and I don’t think it will be approved,” said the teacher, asking that they and their city not be named.

[...]

Residents of restive regions such as Tibet lost their freedom to travel more than a decade ago. Starting in the mid-2010s, some areas applied “personal travel abroad management” rules to local teachers. Last year, after pandemic-era travel restrictions were lifted, more education bureaus began to introduce teacher travel restrictions and stepped them up this summer.

[...]

An entry-level salesperson at a bank in Nanjing said she was told to hand in her passport when she joined the state-owned group last year. After quitting in March, she had to wait six months for a “de-secrecy process” before she was able to retrieve it.

In central Hunan province, a mid-level official at a local government investment fund said he gained approval from nine different departments for a holiday abroad but still could not retrieve his passport.

[...]

The restrictions are hitting retirees as well. A 76-year-old who retired from a state-owned aircraft maker more than 10 years ago said his former employer took his passport back this year for “security reasons” and barred him from visiting family abroad.

[...]

China’s foreign ministry said it was not aware of the situation and referred questions to the relevant authorities.

Archived link

"China’s strategy involves decentralizing tasks horizontally across various security agencies, and vertically by incorporating civilian involvement," says Minxin Pei, a Chinese-American political scientist and author, currently serving as a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, and an expert on Chinese governance, US-East Asia relations, mass surveillance in China, and the democratization of developing nations.

"These civilians, while formally part of the security apparatus, take on key surveillance functions. This creates a unique system where surveillance is distributed and multifaceted, allowing the government to maintain control without the vulnerabilities that come with a single, centralized authority."

[...]

"Official Chinese media don’t play a significant role. Their primary function is to disseminate government-sanctioned messaging. I think that social media is the main target for surveillance because the government has a very sophisticated and effective way of monitoring what’s happening on social media. If a particular topic starts trending, they swiftly intervene to suppress it."

[...]

"This system [of China's control of people] was developed in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. This taught the Chinese Communist Party a very important lesson: they needed to be aware of what was happening in society. Like other dictatorships, the Chinese Communist Party is very fearful of dissenting voices, especially activists, because they need to deter the population from engaging in protests, in anti-regime activities. Most of the time, these activities can be led by a small number of activists. Because they set an example, they show the rest of the population that they are not afraid. To make sure this does not happen, the government relies heavily on surveillance. If somebody dares to challenge the Party’s authority openly, that person will be discovered and punished.

[...]

"By introducing something like a cyber ID, the Party hopes to enhance self-censorship, as people will be afraid to express their dissatisfaction online. However, this approach might backfire. If individuals feel they can’t voice their frustrations online without repercussions, they may resort to more destructive means of expression. That’s why I believe this strategy may not be beneficial. Over time, this will also depend largely on the economy, as the Chinese security apparatus is primarily funded by local governments."

[...]

"If the economy breaks down, it will be the first sign of trouble. You’ll likely see a degradation of the security system and a rise in public discontent. Another concern is the potential for corruption within the system itself. Those in charge of security wield significant power and have access to resources. Instead of using funds for informants or upgrading the system, they might enrich themselves."

[...]

Archived link

China should set a "strong but achievable" target of slashing emissions at least 30 percent by 2035 when it submits updated climate commitments in coming months, a report urged Thursday.

Signatories to the 2015 Paris climate accord must announce by next February their updated roadmaps to achieve the treaty's goal of limiting global temperature rises.

China currently aims to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060.

But its policies and targets are rated "highly insufficient" to limit global warming to 1.5 Celcius above pre-industrial levels, according to the Climate Action Tracker project.

The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a think tank that tracks climate progress, said Beijing should aim for an absolute emissions reduction target of 30 percent.

As the world's largest emitter, China's "ambition in its climate agenda is decisive for keeping the international community on track," CREA said in a report.

To meet that target, Beijing would need to slash electricity sector emissions by 30 percent and emissions from industry by a quarter. It should also set a target of reducing non-CO2 emissions by more than 35 percent, the group said.

[...]

But Teng Fei, deputy director of Tsinghua University's Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, called the "extreme" goal of a 30 percent emissions cut "too ambitious to be achievable".

"I think China is in the process of stabilising its emissions, so it's quite uncertain, for this period, to what extent China can reduce its overall emissions," he said.

China is currently moving to bolster its flagging housing market, which could trigger higher demand in industry, and increase emissions.

[...]

Coal installation is continuing [in China] in a bid to secure baseload supply, and methane emissions are also rising.

[...]

Archived link

Beijing has published its proposed regulations for satellite broadband, including a requirement that operators conduct censorship in real time.

It has been suggested that the constellation system will help run and export the nation's content censorship system, known as the Great Firewall.

[...]

In its latest draft rules, the Cyberspace Administration of China proposes any organization or individual using terminal equipment with direct connection to satellite services is not allowed to "produce, copy, publish, or disseminate content prohibited by laws and administrative regulations, such as content that incites subversion of state power, overthrows the socialist system, endangers national security and interests, damages the national image, incites secession of the country, undermines national unity and social stability, promotes terrorism, extremism, ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, violence, pornography, and false information."

It clarifies that terminal equipment includes civilian handheld, portable, and fixed terminals, as well as terminals installed on aircraft, ships, and vehicles – essentially any device that enables users to access satellite communication systems for voice calls, text messaging, and data exchange.

[...]

The draft rules further include articles that would make tracking of providers and users easier. This includes requiring providers to:

• Obtain licenses and approvals, whether telco, radio frequency related or otherwise;
• Collect real identity information from those using its services, as China already requires of telcos;
• Integrate monitoring and supervision into their platforms to allow Beijing's oversight;
• Locate ground facilities – such as gateway stations and Earth stations – and user data on Chinese soil. Any data that does need to go overseas must be processed through a gateway approved by the telecommunications regulatory department of the State Council.

[...]

China’s problem is essentially that it has too much debt.

The main role of debt is to bring forward demand from the future. [...] China’s stimulus has kept on increasing since 2008, until it peaked with the end of the pandemic.

Now China risks entering a classic ‘debt trap’ where new loans are taken out to repay existing debt – not to create new demand. In other words, the debt is no longer being used to generate growth. In turn, this risks generating a downward spiral.

[...]

The underlying problem, of course, is China’s massive housing bubble. It was probably the largest ever seen. And it has been bursting for some time, with home sales slumping, as the Bloomberg chart shows.

[...]

China needs to urgently boost [domestic] consumption and downsize manufacturing.

[...]

• Housing is currently unaffordable for most people
• The real estate market is an outsize risk for the economy – it is 29% of GDP, and 70% of China’s urban wealth
• Given China’s ageing population, it seems likely [that housing sales] volume could drop at least another 20% before the market bottoms
• That will mean China will need to import a lot less oil, metals, plastics and everything else connected to the bubble.

Archived link

An investigation by the independent Russian media outlet The Insider has uncovered the involvement of four major Chinese banks in the transfer of funds to companies supplying sanctioned equipment to Russian oil firms. They are:

• China Everbright Bank Beijing
• Bank of Ningbo
• Bank of China
• Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).

An analysis of equipment deliveries to Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom reveals details of the transactions.

Archived link

On Wednesday last week, one of China’s largest tea chains found itself at the center of an online storm after a video emerged of employees for the company apparently wearing cardboard signs and makeshift cardboard handcuffs to enforce workplace discipline — public displays of shame that had disturbing echoes of the country’s political past.

The offending post, made on September 17 to the official Douyin and Xiaohongshu accounts of the Guangdong operations of Good Me (古茗茶饮) — a tea chain with more than 5,000 locations across the country — showed several employees on site at a Good Me shop standing with their heads cast down, their hands bound in front with what appeared to be cardboard cup holders. Handwritten signs around their necks read: “The crime of forgetting to include a straw”; and “The crime of knocking over the teapot.”

[...]

For China’s media and internet authorities, the Cultural Revolution is generally not a subject to be talked about at all. And for many Chinese who remember the period, which was ended by the ouster and arrest in October 1976 of the so-called Gang of Four, it remains a silent source of pain and fear.

[...]

Most comments on the video on both platforms expressed shock and ridicule at what seemed to be extremely unfair and inhumane treatment of employees on the one hand, and an acute lack of good taste on the other. By Wednesday the video had been removed and Good Me was scrambling to contain the damage.

[...]

Archived link

The brutal killing of a Japanese schoolboy in the Chinese city of Shenzhen last week has made headlines across the world. The wider context of the tragedy — that it happened on the anniversary of the “Mukden Incident” that began Japan’s invasion of China nearly a century ago, and just months after another nearly deadly attack on a Japanese mother and her child in another city — raises serious questions about how it might be linked to decades of anti-Japanese education, entertainment and cultural conditioning in China.

But these are serious questions China’s media are not asking, or cannot ask.

How the media in China have reported the incident domestically (or not) is an unfortunate reminder not just of how stringent controls have become, but also how detrimental this atmosphere has been to discussion of the darker undercurrents of contemporary Chinese society.

[...]

From the early stages of the incident, key details were missing. The police report from Shenzhen did not mention the boy’s nationality, age, or where the attack took place.

[...]

In all likelihood, reports [...] were removed by the authorities because they jumped the gun, not waiting for an official news release (通稿) from Xinhua News Agency. Generally, for such sensitive stories, more compliant media know that protocol demands that they wait for official word. State media, therefore, kept silent on the issue until after Lin Jian (林剑), a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), held a press conference late on September 18, and again on September 19.

[...]

Hunan Daily, for example, the official mouthpiece of the provincial CCP leadership in the province, quoted Lin Jian verbatim, offering no additional details or context. The same was true of Shanghai’s The Paper, published by the state-owned Shanghai United Media Group, and other provincial-level dailies such as Guizhou Daily.

[...]

The Shenzhen attack is a sensitive story on a number of fronts for China. For starters, the government — which has touted increasing foreign visits as a mark of economic turnaround — is wary of frightening away foreign tourists, businesspeople, and investors. The attack, the third high-profile assault on foreigners in China in recent months, risks undermining the leadership’s message that China is open and ready to engage again with the world following the pandemic downturn.

The attack also risks undermining the simplistic narrative, advanced by state media, that China is fundamentally a society encouraging tolerance among civilizations — which has lately been a key pillar of what the leadership calls “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture.” The case tells us that despite China’s rhetoric of civilizational tolerance, the country has its own share, like perhaps any country, of individuals capable of violent xenophobia.

But the most sensitive aspect of this story, the most dangerous question that can be asked, is why. Why is China experiencing such violent attacks, and against the Japanese in particular? The answer to that question is no doubt complex. And yet, as netizens made clear in their early, stillborn conversations on the Shenzhen attack, the role of China’s officially-encouraged culture of xenophobic ire — a culture of “toxic nationalism” — is a serious issue that needs to be addressed.

The brutal truth behind this savage attack is that this problem will not go away until the antipathy at its root, present in the media discourse of the state as much as in the heart of the attacker, can be faced head on.

Archived link

At a less well-reported meeting in Beijing late last year, organised by the China-Africa Business Council, officials pushed for the rapid expansion of Chinese private security firms [in countries of the Global South]. ‘Outbound Chinese investors face security challenges and a complex environment,’ said an official statement.

[...]

Officials are concerned about the fate of programmes under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which started as a global infrastructure programme, but has evolved into an umbrella for just about everything China does overseas to further its influence. Projects have stalled or collapsed under a mountain of unsustainable debt and growing resentment at the outsize role of Chinese firms and labour. In Pakistan, for instance, Gwadar Port, built by China as key part of a $62 billion (£47 billion) China-Pakistan economic corridor has been under virtual siege by Baloch separatists, who have targeted Chinese engineers. Chinese-owned mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo have also been targeted.

A BRI working group recently highlighted the need to ‘hammer out the safety protection in a detailed way,’ according to the state-owned Xinhua news agency.

[...]

China now has overseas economic investments and assets worth well over a trillion dollars by most estimates. It has set up around 47,000 overseas firms across 190 countries or regions, according to the Ministry of Commerce.

[...]

Beijing now seems to have concluded that they are dangerously exposed, particularly at a time of growing economic stress and geopolitical tensions and require a local security apparatus to match.

[...]

The Solomon Islands provide a template for China. Last year, they signed a deal on police cooperation with Beijing as part of an upgrade of their relations to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. The Chinese telecoms company Huawei is building a cellular network on the Islands, and a Chinese state company plans to redevelop the port in the capital, Honiara.

[...]

China had less success with Thailand, where the government scrapped plans for joint patrols with Chinese police in popular tourist spots following criticism that it compromised Thai national sovereignty, and a rebuke from the country’s police chief. There was also anger on social media. ‘Thailand will become a complete surveillance state’, was one typical response, though among other autocrats more welcoming of Chinese, that seems to be precisely the point.

A Hong Kong man is facing as long as 10 years in jail after he pleaded guilty to sedition for wearing a T-shirt featuring a protest slogan.

In court on Monday, Chu Kai-pong, 27, was the first person to be convicted under Hong Kong’s tough homegrown national security law enacted in March.

[...]

He was arrested on June 12 at a train station wearing a T-shirt with the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times”, and a yellow mask printed with “FDNOL” – the shorthand for another pro-democracy slogan, “five demands, not one less”. June 12 is a date associated with protests in the city in 2019.

[...]

Chu’s lawyer argued that the maximum he could be given would be two years.

Archived link

Over the past decade and a half, the Chinese techno-authoritarian state has deeply entrenched itself in the day-to-day lives of citizens through the use of highly sophisticated surveillance technology. Two of the world’s largest manufacturers of video surveillance equipment, Hikvision and Dahua, have revolutionized the industry and exported their products to hundreds of countries worldwide.

Chinese citizens are required to use their ID when engaging in various activities, from signing up for WeChat, the ubiquitous messaging app, to using super-apps like Alipay or WeChat Pay for tasks such as public transport, online shopping, and booking movie tickets.

This extensive network allows the government to track citizens’ everyday activities and create detailed profiles, effectively establishing a Panopticon state of censorship and repression.

The most prominent feature of China’s surveillance state is its extensive network of facial recognition cameras, which are nearly ubiquitous. The Chinese government launched a programme known as Skynet in 2005, which mandated the installation of millions of cameras throughout the nation.

This initiative was further expanded in 2015 with the introduction of SharpEyes, aiming for complete video coverage of ‘key public areas’ by 2020.

The government, in collaboration with camera manufacturers such as Hikvision and Dahua, framed this as a progressive step towards developing ‘smart cities’ that would enhance disaster response, traffic management, and crime detection.

However, the technology has been predominantly employed for repressive purposes, reinforcing compliance with the Communist Party of China.

[...]

Although many of the ‘threats’ identified by this system may turn out to be false alarms, the omnipresent vigilance of the state ensures that even the slightest dissent from citizens is swiftly suppressed.

[...]

China has become the first known instance of a government employing artificial intelligence for racial profiling, a practice referred to as ‘automated racism’, with its extensive facial recognition technologies specifically identifying and monitoring minority groups, particularly Uyghur Muslims, who have been subjected to numerous human rights violations by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

[This inlcudes] mass detentions, forced labour, religious oppression, political indoctrination, forced sterilisation and abortion, as well as sexual assault.

In Xinjiang, an extreme form of mass surveillance has transformed the province into a battleground, with military-grade cyber systems imposed on the civilian population, while the significant investment in policing and suppressing Uyghur Muslims has established Xinjiang as a testing ground for highly intrusive surveillance technologies that may be adopted by other authoritarian regimes, and the Chinese government has been known to collect DNA samples from Uyghur Muslims residing in Xinjiang, a move that has drawn widespread international condemnation for its unethical application of science and technology.

[...]

The Chinese government has adeptly formulated legislation that unites citizens and the state against private enterprises. Laws such as the Personal Information Protection Law and the Data Security Law, both enacted in 2021, impose stringent penalties on companies that fail to secure user consent for data collection, effectively diverting scrutiny away from the state’s own transgressions.

[...]

Instead, state media and officials highlight Xinjiang’s economic development as evidence of the success of past policies, promoting a Chinese concept of human rights that prioritizes the right to development and survival as fundamental. The [Chinese Communist Party] CCP views development as a pre-condition for the realization of human rights [...]

The economic development in Xinjiang is undeniable [yet] it remains questionable how much Uyghurs and other minorities genuinely benefit from these projects and what the true cost of this development is.

[...]

The CCP’s focus is on showcasing the achievements of China’s approach to human rights through the promotion of development, with Uyghurs increasingly highlighted not only in the context of poverty alleviation, but also as representatives of a minority group benefiting from Chinese development policies and as symbols of a unified Chinese identity.

[...]

In recent years, the Chinese government has sought to paint a positive image of Xinjiang by showcasing Uyghur heritage and culture as a major attraction for tourists. Uyghurs are often depicted dancing, celebrating Muslim festivals, and wearing their traditional clothes.

[...]

While the display of cultural heritage is prominently featured in the portrayal of Xinjiang’s development, Uyghur culture is clearly subordinate to Chinese culture. As Pan Yue, director of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, states, Chinese culture serves as the binding element to create a unified Chinese identity, with ethnic minorities seen as “contributors to Chinese culture.” When officials describe Chinese identity as an inclusive umbrella term, it actually refers to a tightly controlled portrayal of ethnic minority cultures, limited to showcasing the success of a unified Chinese nation. This is not only achieved through external propaganda but (unsurprisingly) also through repressive policies aimed at assimilating and Sinicizing ethnic minorities.

[...]

While Chinese state media showed images of Uyghurs celebrating Eid al-Fitr (the end of Ramadan), the reality has been that Muslims could not freely practice their religion.

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Schools and training institutions were prohibited from offering religious services to students. They were also required to distribute surveys asking students about their family’s habits, including whether they fast. Lectures on maintaining social order and stability, as well as health-related topics emphasizing regular meals, were scheduled during the hours of breaking the fast. These measures and restrictions were not only directed at Uyghurs, but also targeted Muslims in other provinces, such as Gansu.

[...]

Beijing invites journalists, politicians and researchers from various countries to “see Xinjiang with their own eyes” on carefully orchestrated tours designed to internalize and spread images and stories of improved living conditions and the preservation of Uyghur heritage to an international audience. As the Chinese government faces reputation damage from allegations of human rights violations in Xinjiang, the portrayal of a flourishing economy alongside a pro-active construction of a unified Chinese identity acts as a strategy to win the “hearts and minds,” particularly in Arab countries and the Global South. This narrative aims to project a message of a rapidly developing, diverse yet united Xinjiang under CCP leadership, contradicting Western accusations and presenting an alternative model to Western concepts of human rights and development.

Political decision-makers in Europe and beyond should be mindful of the intertwined reality of economic development and forced assimilation when addressing the situation in Xinjiang. What the Chinese state media share in hundreds of articles as a success story of human rights in Xinjiang is, in fact, a CCP-approved narrative. This narrative selectively preserves certain cultural aspects to showcase the success of China’s concepts and values, particularly emphasizing the prioritized role of the right to survival and development as central to human rights. Recipients of this narrative should recognize that the concepts of “normalization” and “maintaining social stability” for development primarily serve the interests of the CCP, not those of the Uyghurs and other minorities. Ultimately, they [Uyghurs] only benefit from Xinjiang’s development as long as they conform to the image that the CCP crafted for them.

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The teachings on the ideology of China’s leader are encased in a new subject now mandatory for secondary students, Citizenship, Economics and Society, first announced in 2022.

Hong Kong has introduced Xi Jinping Thought as a new addition to the curriculum for some students.

Xi has been the president of the People's Republic of China since 2013.

The new school year began in Hong Kong this week.

The changes come alongside more lessons about national security and pro-Beijing patriotism, as the influence and control of China’s ruling Communist party increases in the semi-autonomous city, The Guardian reported.

The teachings on the ideology of China’s leader are encased in a new subject now mandatory for secondary students, Citizenship, Economics and Society, first announced in 2022.

[...]

The new module instils “patriotic education” for all three years of secondary students, and its content is aimed at “cultivating students’ sense of nationhood, affection for our country and sense of national identity”, according to government-issued curriculum guidelines. Third form students are expected to learn about Xi Jinping Thought in a module on “our country’s political structure and participation in international affairs”. The guidelines recommend teachers spend 12 40-minute lessons on the module.

Xi’s personal political philosophy, officially called “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, was enshrined in China’s constitution in 2018. In 2021 it was introduced into mainland Chinese schools. The Xi teachings in the mainland curriculum appear on available information to be far more comprehensive that those introduced to Hong Kong. However it has still sparked alarm among some parents and citizens.

Hong Kong school enrolments have declined sharply in recent years, driven by low birthrates and an exodus of residents and expats in the wake of the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement and the imposition of tighter, pro-CCP social controls.

“Authoritarian legality:" China’s oppression, mass imprisonment of the Uyghur minority amounts to "genocide" the world "has not seen since World War II", study says

Here is the study: Uyghur Race as the Enemy: China’s Legalized Authoritarian Oppression and Mass Imprisonment (pdf)

Chinese authorities sentences Uyghurs -a minority in Nothwestern China- to prison for an average of 9 years, including for "offences" such as wearing a hijab or sending money to family abroad.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to “legalize” and “normalize” Uyghur persecution by incorporating it into the pre-existing criminal justice system "undermining the possibility of a life of dignity, prosperity, and freedom for future generations as well," the researchers say.

• Evidence indicates that trials against Uyghurs, if they happened at all, have been cursory and performative rather than substantive.There are countless documented arrests that were almost immediately followed by formal imprisonment in less than a month.

• The Uyghur population is currently set to suffer from a cumulative total of 4.4 million years of imprisonment, "undermining the possibility of a life of dignity, prosperity, and freedom for future generations as well," the researchers say.

• Almost 90% of criminal records in Xinjiang are not public, even though legal records in other Chinese regions are, meaning that records of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who are known to be imprisoned were unavailable for the context of this particular analysis.

• Additionally, the limited data available does not provide substantive information on incarcerations. There exist 13,088 entries for which no official reason for arrest or incarceration was made available to anyone, including families and loved ones, with 3,849 of those in- dividuals known to be incarcerated and 9,059 of those individuals whose status remains unclear.

• 25,155 entries [in the official the database] do not even have sentencing data, and most entries provide only unclear reasons for indictment, such as “Flagged by autonomous-region IJOP (一体化推送人员)” or “Four lines (meaning unclear) (四条线).”

The victims’ families were left in no better position when it came to transparency and communication of the victims’ status, in some cases being left oblivious to their family members’ imprisonment for years. The report cites case of Mr. Abdurahm Tohti’s family:

Mr. Tohti was living in Istanbul when he lost contact with his wife and two kids—the youngest being only five months old.31 Mr. Tohti’s entire family was sentenced to a total of 90 years after their disappearance 7 years ago, but only recently did Mr. Tohti learn of the sentencing through other locals. Mr. Tohti still does not know what his wife or kids were charged with. In another case, Uyghur professor and ethnographer Rahile Dawut’s daughter lost contact with her in 2017. Her daughter, who lives in the United States, did not hear any news regarding what had happened to her mother until four years later, in 2023—only to find out that she had been sentenced to life in prison. She has not spoken to her mother since, and is unable to ask anybody in Xinjiang for more details. This opaqueness has led to immense frustration and caused tremendous pain for Ms. Dawut’s daughter.

"These are merely emblematic examples. Many families have endured a similar fate, not knowing what happened to their loved ones after they disappeared," the report says.

Corruption is especially widespread among officials with already high incomes and has a massive impact on earnings. While only seven per cent of officials proven to be corrupt would normally belong to the top one per cent of earners in urban China, the figure would rise to 91 per cent when considering illegal income. However, the far-reaching measures already taken by China with 3.7 million sanctions systematically inhibit corruption.

These are the findings of a study conducted by Germany's ZEW Mannheim with the City University of New York in the U.S. The study is the first of its kind to analyse the financial benefits of corruption for the individual perpetrators, drawing on data from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party.

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A surge of Chinese plastic supply is threatening to overflow in the face of weak domestic demand, morphing into a fresh trade challenge for the rest of the world.

“Everyone in China has this notion that if they are fast enough, if they are the first in the industry, able to burn cash long enough, then they will become the survivor that takes market share. And then they can raise the price,” said Ms Vivien Zheng, Asia chemicals analyst with Bloomberg Intelligence.

• Plants have mushroomed along the country’s eastern coast over the last decade, built in a race to satisfy China’s hunger for plastic and to help refiners counter an expected downturn in transport fuels, as electric vehicles take off. Vast volumes and lacklustre post-pandemic demand mean margins are paper thin – but companies have kept producing, hoping to cling to existing market share.

• “This is yet another example – after steel and solar panels – where China’s structural imbalances are clearly spilling over into global markets,” one expert for Chinese industries said. In an echo of its predicament from batteries to green-energy technology, the world’s second-largest economy is staring down a situation of dramatic industrial excess.

• Factories currently navigate the supply surge with brief shutdowns and low run rates, but as production capacity continues to be added, petrochemical executives and sector analysts say surpluses will grow – enough in many products to turn China into a significant exporter, often selling into a glut and potentially exacerbating existing trade tensions.

• “China’s substantial investments between 2020 and 2027 have reshaped global supply dynamics, leading to a structural surplus in Asia and persistent low or negative profit margins,” said Ms Kelly Cui, principal petrochemicals analyst at Wood Mackenzie. The consultancy estimates that almost a quarter of global ethylene capacity is at risk of closure, even as China is still adding more.

• Between 2019 and the end of 2024, China will have completed construction of so many plants to turn crude oil and gas into products such as ethylene and propylene – materials behind everything from plastic bottles to machinery – that nameplate capacity is now equal to Europe, Japan and South Korea combined, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

• Part of the reason is that smaller plants do not require approvals from Beijing, as large refineries do. The local authorities were quick to see the opportunity to use cheap land and fiscal perks to encourage job creation and investment. All sought to feed demand for a plastic known as polypropylene, used for plastic packaging, automobile parts and electrical appliances.

• But as supply flowed, domestic demand faltered. Now the trouble is that financial and market-share pressures are also adding up.

• China is already a net exporter of polyester products such as PVC and PET, used in clothing or food containers, shipping them to countries like Nigeria, Vietnam and India, according to an expert, again creating or worsening trade surpluses.

• Most of the new facilities in China were installed in the last three or five years despite slowing demand, which makes this economic development harder and harder to sustain.

In a video shared on the Chinese video social media platform Douyin by Uyghur users, it shows that Chinese farmers are tilling the lands with tractors while a Uyghur woman films and speaks without showing her face. She is still risking her life by sharing such a sensitive incident in China.

The voice of the video says: “Yaxhsimu Siler Kopchilik (How are you all)? As you see, they forcefully seized all of the lands from local farmers in Ghulja’s Baytoqay town, Chighliq Mazar village, without the permission of the farmers, without paying ten cents. Now they (default meaning Chinese settlers) are tilling there. What do you all think about this? Please remember this.”