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The EU Parliament will publish all data on election night from across all EU countries on here:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en

Projections and estimates by national parties will start to published soon (from 18:00 GMT+2). First overall projection (European overview) at 20:15 GMT+2. Actual results at 23:00 GMT+2.

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It is almost common knowledge that elections in Hungary are characterized by a lack of a level playing field, as noted in the final report of the OSCE-ODIHR Election Observation Mission for the 2022 parliamentary elections. The results of an investigation by Political Capital, a research institute in Hu.gary, funded by the European Media and Information Fund, into political advertising spending and the promotion of hostile disinformation narratives on social media during the 2024 election campaign in Hungary have just confirmed this. The current analysis follows our previous report published at the end of April, and covers the period from 31 December 2023 to 1 June 2024.

- Political ad spending in Hungary is highly asymmetric. While the pro-government camp spent €4.3 million on Meta and Google ads, all 14 opposition parties and their associated media spent less than a fifth of that, €839,000.

- Fidesz and its politicians alone spent €2.0 million, 2.6 times more than all 14 opposition parties combined, which totaled €764,558.

- Fidesz’s campaign has been heavily supported by third parties, mainly two GONGOs, Megafon and Civil Union Forum, which spent an additional €2.3 million. In contrast, opposition proxies spent a total of €74,530.

- Government-organized media also played their part in the campaign, spending €1.8 million on advertising, although not exclusively on political issues. In contrast, independent media spent only €46,648.

- The level of online political advertising spending in Hungary is outstanding even by European standards. Fidesz was the biggest advertiser on Google in the EU this year, paying for six of the 10 most promoted videos. On Meta, Megafon ranked 10th and Fidesz 12th in the ranking of EU countries based on political ad spending data between 14 April and 13 May.

- Fidesz and its proxies are the main purveyors of hostile disinformation narratives in Hungary, responsible for 98.6% of the total €2.0 million spent on promoting such narratives. All opposition parties and their partisan media share the remaining 1.4%.

- The data confirm that Fidesz largely outsources its negative campaigning to third parties: while Fidesz's proxies spent €1.6 million promoting narratives hostile to Fidesz’s political opponents, Fidesz spent only €397,137 directly.

- The most promoted hostile narrative in the whole period from 4 February to 1 June targeted the newly emerged opposition hopeful Péter Magyar, accounting for 46% of total spending on promoting such narratives.

- The second most promoted hostile narrative, accounting for 34% of total spending, concerns the war in Ukraine, suggesting that “European pro-war politicians and their Hungarian servants want to start World War III”. This narrative gradually grew in importance as the elections approached, overtaking and partly absorbing all other narratives in the final weeks.

- The third most promoted hostile narrative, accounting for 9% of total spending, is about anti-government forces allegedly serving foreign interests.

- The degree of social media dominance revealed by our investigation makes the political contest in Hungary truly one-sided and points to the problem of massive state-sponsored information manipulation in the EU and NATO.

- The dominance of anti-Western, pro-Kremlin hostile disinformation narratives promoted by the Fidesz camp is consistent with the findings of our recent study showing that Fidesz MEPs are “soft defenders” of Russia and other authoritarian regimes in the European Parliament, engaging in pro-Kremlin discourse while deliberately abstaining from voting due to political and reputational risks. Moreover, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Fidesz MEPs increasingly abstained from voting on Russia-related issues and even began to vote against resolutions condemning the Kremlin.

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In May 2024, the United States imposed new sanctions on three Russian government entities and four Russian companies in response to its full-scale war and use of chemical weapons against Ukraine. The United States determined Russia used the chemical weapon chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops and riot control agents (RCA) as a method of warfare in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Chloropicrin is a choking agent that “causes severe irritation to the skin, eyes, respiratory tract (if inhaled), and gastrointestinal tract (if inhaled or ingested).” In cases of severe exposure, it can be deadly causing “potentially fatal accumulation of fluid in the lungs.”

Russia’s use of such chemicals is not an isolated incident, and is probably driven by Russian forces’ desire to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and drive them into the line of fire, the exact reason the CWC prohibits the use of RCA as method of warfare, and achieve tactical gains on the battlefield. Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons program and has used chemical weapons, such as the Novichok nerve agents, at least twice in recent years in assassination attempts.

Cover Up and Distract

To conceal and divert attention from its violations, the Kremlin routinely spreads unfounded and debunked allegations accusing the United States and Ukraine of using chemical and biological weapons activities in Ukraine. Russia uses this well-established disinformation tactic, sometimes referred to as “mirror politics,” to falsely accuse others of the very violations Russia commits or plans to commit.

In the lead-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem falsely accused the United States and Ukraine of planning “provocations” (false flag operations) with the use of chemical weapons, likely in an attempt to demonize Ukraine and provide a pretext for Kremlin aggression. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began, the Kremlin has continuously spread false claims about Ukrainian chemical weapons, alleging to have discovered “chemically hazardous substances,” accusing Ukraine of using UAVs adapted for chemical weapons use, and claiming that the United States supports Ukraine’s use of chemical weapons. All of these claims are deceptive.

It is, in fact, the Russian Federation that has an active chemical weapons program and is in violation of its international obligations under the CWC.

Russian Soldiers Admit to Using RCAs

As the Kremlin disseminates false accusations against Ukraine and the United States, Russian soldiers and pro-Kremlin media brag about the Russian Army’s use of RCAs in Ukraine.

In May 2024, Russia’s state-funded media outlet RT [3 MB] published a video report on Telegram claiming to show a “gas grenade” used by the Russian Army against Ukrainian soldiers.

In May 2023, Russia’s state-controlled Channel 1 broadcast an interview with a Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces. In the video, drone footage shows a grenade being dropped into a trench, smoke billowing from the trench, and then soldiers fleeing from the trench. On the broadcast, the soldier states, “We are trying to force them out with smoke.” The broadcast goes on to state, “Soldiers from the 88th Brigade are using the so-called ‘Bird-Cherry’ tear grenades.” According to independent media outlet Meduza, Bird-Cherry tear grenades, known in Russian as Cheremukha, may “contain the chemical warfare agent chloroacetophenone. The substance can cause a burning sensation in the eyes, corneal clouding, and vision impairment, as well as shortness of breath, coughing, and burns on the skin.”

In October 2023, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States asked Russia to explain the above-described Channel 1 broadcast. To date, Russia has claimed that its forces’ statements were a “misunderstanding.”

In December 2023, Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade stated on its Telegram channel that the brigade is using a “radical change in tactics” by dropping K-51 grenades on Ukrainian forces to “smoke them out from their fortified positions.” According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Brigade later edited the post in an apparent effort to hide Russia’s violation of the CWC. In January 2024, the Brigade published another post about receiving a “combat order” to use K-51 grenades and reported using them.

Russian soldiers talked about using drones to drop the Bird-Cherry tear grenades on Ukrainian positions in interviews with the Russian media and there have been several posts on Telegram (examples 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) by pro-Kremlin actors, mostly by the so-called “pro-war bloggers,” describing the use of RCAs by Russia’s armed forces.

On March 4, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense reported that Russia carried out 1,068 chemical weapons attacks since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. British media outlet The Telegraph on April 6 confirmed that “Russian troops are carrying out a systematic campaign of illegal chemical attacks against Ukrainian soldiers.”

History of Kremlin Chemical Weapons Use and Disinformation Campaigns

Russia’s use of chloropicrin in Ukraine marks the first time since World War One that this agent is being deployed on the battlefield, but the Kremlin had used chloropicrin before. For example, in 1989, the Soviet Union used chloropicrin against demonstrators in Georgia.

The Kremlin has a history of spreading disinformation about chemical weapons. The Russian government spreads false claims to shield its ally, the Syrian regime, from accountability after the Assad regime’s repeated use of chemical weapons from 2013-2019. The Kremlin also denied its own responsibility for the 2018 Novichok poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the United Kingdom and the subsequent, related death of a UK citizen in Amesbury. The Kremlin also tried to evade responsibility for the Novichok poisoning of the late Russian opposition politician and anti-corruption activist Aleksey Navalny in 2020. In those cases, Kremlin propagandists resorted to the same tactics we observe today in Ukraine, blaming others for Russia’s own crimes and invoking so-called “provocations.”

In each case, the Kremlin used its seat in multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a platform to spread its disinformation. Despite Russia’s attempts to use disinformation to lobby officials from various countries, Moscow lost (for the first time in its history) its seat on the Executive Council of the OPCW on November 29 to Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland. This rejection demonstrated OPCW States Parties’ resolve to hold Russia to account for its actions – including its war of aggression against Ukraine and continued violations of the CWC.

By spreading disinformation through media and from international platforms, Russia attempts to create confusion and obfuscate facts to sow enough doubt to undermine the unity and effectiveness of an international response to Russia’s own chemical weapons use. The international community remains united – Russia’s use of chemical weapons is unacceptable.

Chinese air force jets circled a Dutch frigate and approached a Dutch helicopter in the East China Sea in a way that "caused a potentially unsafe situation," the Netherlands' Defense Ministry said on Saturday.

In a statement, the Ministry said the HNLMS Tromp was patrolling on Friday in support of U.N. sanctions against North Korea when it was circled several times by two Chinese fighter jets.

Later, the ship's NH90 helicopter was approached by two Chinese fighter jets and a helicopter.

"The incident took place in international airspace," the ministry said. The Tromp is heading for Japan next and then to Hawaii for the "Rim of the Pacific" naval exercises.

So Sumar's (Spanish party) politicians will apparently be distributed across both The Left and the Greens European parties. Presumably an image maneuver, since joining an European party usually doesn't bind your vote, and Spanish green parties usually get integrated in leftist electoral options anyway.

Documentary series on the history of Brexit.

REMINDER: don't forget to vote for the European parliament.

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The hope that Beijing would distance itself, however minimally, from Moscow has finally been extinguished. Europe needs to adjust its approach accordingly.

Written by Maximilian Mayer, professor of International Relations and the Global Politics of Technology at the University of Bonn, Germany • Emilian Kavalski, NAWA Chair professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. Poland.

That Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing for a long war not just in Ukraine, but against Western democracies more broadly, should hardly be news, even if many in Europe and North America refuse to acknowledge this fact. At least since the 2008 Russian intervention in the conflict in Georgia, Putin has condoned a series of both hot and hybrid warfare campaigns to weaken the democratic fabric of countries in Russia’s vicinity and further afield. It was recently revealed that on the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia launched a spacecraft to test nuclear anti-satellite weapons, further evidence of Moscow’s plan for long-term confrontation with the West, beyond what it considers its “near abroad.”

Yet, that China is willing to fully back Putin’s effort to threaten and undermine liberal democratic states is certainly a newsflash. Ever since Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022, Beijing has been treading carefully to avoid perceptions that it is overtly supporting Moscow and has been claiming to occupy a neutral position – even if China has been leaning toward Russia’s side.

The reason seems obvious. Despite increasing tariffs, anti-subsidy probes, and European derisking strategies, both China’s export-oriented economy and the bottom line of most Chinese companies are still tied to trade with Western firms as part of global supply chains. It was therefore common sense to assume that Beijing would move cautiously to avoid jeopardizing its economic security in the context of an increasingly unpredictable domestic market and escalating economic tensions with the United States.

However, either such assessments have been misplaced or China’s wariness appears to have evaporated. The spark of hope that Beijing would distance itself, however minimally, from Moscow has been finally extinguished.

The most recent joint diplomatic statement by Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping suggests that China and Russia, although not formally allies, have formed a bloc-like alliance that is geared toward undermining security in Europe. The joint statement issued after last month’s meeting between Putin and Xi in Beijing explicitly stated that both partners “believe that all nuclear weapons states… should refrain from infringing upon each other’s vital interests through the expansion of military alliances and coalitions, as well as the establishment of military bases in close proximity to the borders of the other nuclear weapons states.” In other words, this passage spells out what China understands by insisting upon the “legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries.”

The comprehensive clarity of the lengthy statement goes beyond the mere reiteration of Putin’s talking points. It boils down to an explicit statement of intent – namely, Beijing’s intent to work with Moscow in undermining Europe’s security at a moment when the EU has communicated that Russia’s war against Ukraine is an “existential” threat to Europe. China is not only ready to challenge NATO’s guarantee for the security of states in Eastern Europe, but also the increasing activities of the Western European members of the alliance on NATO’s eastern flank in support of Ukraine.

It is significant that Xi’s meeting with Putin came on the heels of the Chinese leader’s visit to Serbia and Hungary. This trip was indicative of China’s strategic direction. Xi visited Serbia on the 25th anniversary of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, something that he stated the Chinese people will “never forget.” In Hungary, Xi signed a new security pact, which would allow Chinese law enforcement to conduct patrols in the country and install surveillance equipment. However, as revelations of a number of secret annexes to the pact suggest, Chinese police officers may avail themselves of the Schengen travel arrangements and visit other European countries to conduct “secret missions,” including arresting dissidents and bringing them back to Hungary before taking them to China.

The joint statement between Putin and Xi is quite unambiguous that the strategic infrastructure of Western “military alliances” is perceived as a threat to both China and Russia. The call for the establishment of loosely defined buffer zones in the peripheries of nuclear powers is surprising, in that it goes against China’s self-avowed principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and contradicts the habitually repeated Chinese warnings against “Cold War mentality.” More than that, this statement also indicates that Beijing and Moscow are throwing under the bus the national sovereignty of the smaller states in between. Instead, might makes right – small states will be subject to the whims of great powers and their spheres of influence.

It is not far-fetched to interpret the Sino-Russian statement as Beijing’s legitimization of Moscow’s brinkmanship in Europe, short of using nuclear weapons. It is no coincidence, that immediately after the Putin-Xi meeting, Russia’s defense ministry posted a draft proposal for the revision of the country’s maritime borders in the eastern Baltic Sea. A few days later, in another test of Western resolve, Russian border guards removed dozens of light buoys demarcating the Estonia-Russia border along the Narva River.

While the full implications of the joint statement will become more obvious in the coming weeks and months, several takeaways help to shed light on the contours of Sino-European relations during the new Cold War.

First, in the midst of mutual retaliatory rhetoric about trade restrictions, this is China’s loudest signal yet that its strategic outlook is officially framed from the perspective of a new Cold War with the West. While Russia might be playing a “junior partner” in the alliance, it is Beijing that is following Moscow’s lead into uncompromising strategic antagonism with the West and especially the European Union. This does not mean that there is ample trust between Russia and China, but the logic of a bloc confrontation is underpinning Beijing’s commitment to cooperate with Moscow ever more closely. The symbolic gesture of Putin’s official visit to the Harbin Institute of Technology, which could indicate more Russian access to Chinese defense technology, has not been lost on European observers.

In the new Cold War, Russia is more important to the Chinese leadership than Europe. The relevance of bilateral relations goes beyond the reality of growing economic complementarities and trade figures between the two Eurasian giants. The joint statement is the strongest indication yet that China is not averse to forming a military alliance with Russia. The document clearly spells out that bloc confrontation is the new game in town, despite Chinese reassurances about further economic opening and a charm offensive to European businesses. In France, Xi only offered a vague answer to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s plea to limit the deliveries of dual use goods to Russia. Beijing, it seems, has already priced in the inadvertent “loss of Europe” as the cost of its partnership with Moscow.

In the new Cold War, Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific are part of a united Eurasian strategic theater. Geographically, just like the 20th-century Cold War, the new one reflects the expansive logic of malleable buffer zones. The fault lines of the Sino-Russian confrontation with the West follow a north-south gradient across the landmass of Eastern Europe and a southwest-northeast gradient from the South China Sea to the Korean Peninsula. Although China has officially always rejected the connections between the Ukraine and Taiwan crises, this linkage is now more conspicuous than ever before. While such a scenario will probably be hard to swallow for Europe, it is becoming hard to ignore that China will be part of any future European security order. Europe, given its overreliance on U.S. security provision, has less wiggle room and no choice but to get closer with the United States.

Europe’s security requires significant realignment of its strategic focus. Faced with large-scale crises such as migration, economic inequality, climate change, and populism, European policymakers struggle to formulate a coherent strategy. The prospect of a strengthened Russian economy and sustained armed conflict in Ukraine presents new challenges that call on Europe to enhance its military capabilities and seriously prepare for a range of contingencies. It appears that both Moscow and Beijing are ready for the turbulence of the new Cold War. European leaders are still to fully grasp its reality.

The joint China-Russia statement marks a world political closure. Bloc confrontation is a new reality, although the rest of the world tries as hard as possible to avoid taking sides. In the absence of significant hard power, Europe does not have the luxury of contemplating a neutral position. Economic interdependencies with China become more problematic. Trade and security policies are now not only seen as intimately entangled, but also point in increasingly contradictory directions. Current attempts at decoupling between the economies of China and the West will thus likely intensify, rendering the management of conflicts increasingly difficult.

As the West might fracture under the pressure of multiple crises and see its resolve buckle through the constant disinformation campaigns of Russia and China, it is difficult to anticipate what trajectories the confrontation will take. In this precarious new Cold War scenario, Europe has to consider both the attitude of a new U.S. administration and Chinese views on such contingencies.

For instance, what would leaders in Beijing view a possible “win” for China in Ukraine? Some Chinese experts are betting on a “Korean” type solution for the conflict. This would include a buffer zone between Russia and NATO in Europe and a demilitarized zone partitioning Ukrainian territory. As a result, Russia would be in a stronger position to seek domination over Eastern Europe’s states as well as pressure NATO to roll back its membership to pre-1994 levels.

The most pressing issue along the two geographical fault lines in the coming years is keeping the new Cold War “cold” and preventing it from becoming a full-blown global hot war. Overall, there are reasons not to be overly pessimistic. The logic of nuclear deterrence is functional. China and the United States are ill-prepared to fight a war, and the risk of skirmishes in the South China Sea makes both sides more restrained. However, escalatory trends remain and flash points are multiplying, while mechanisms to avoid escalation such as monitoring, mutual surveillance programs, and regular military-to-military talks are few and far between.

For Europe, to maintain a sense of pragmatic optimisms is more difficult. China and the United States can rely on historical precedent to ensure their coexistence as superpowers and create, for example, their own version of SALT. Europe, however, does not possess historical templates and its tripartite approach to China – as partner, competitor, and rival – is woefully outdated because it lacks a security angle altogether.

Europe needs to quickly come to grips with a China that both openly supports Russia’s imperial war and works with Moscow to end NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe.

Haichang Group founder Qu Naijie purchased 27 Bordeaux châteaus in just a few years, but French officials found some of the deals were financed illegally with Chinese government funds

A Paris tribunal has found Qu Naijie, the 63-year-old founder of Chinese corporation Haichang Group, guilty of money laundering, sentencing him to a three-year suspended prison sentence, a €1 million fine and the confiscation of nine of his Bordeaux châteaus, worth an estimated €35.5 million ($38.4 million).

The case has stunned Bordeaux. Qu was one of several wealthy Chinese figures who arrived in the region a decade ago, buying lesser-known châteaus with plans to invest in and market them to the growing Chinese wine market. Now, both Chinese and French authorities have accused him of running a scam.

Diving into the Wine Business

Qu was well-known in Bordeaux. Working with Christian Delpeuch, former president of the Bordeaux trade group Le Conseil Interprofessionnel du Vin de Bordeaux (CIVB) and ex-CEO of the négociant Ginestet, Qu snapped up 27 Bordeaux wineries in four years starting in 2010, spending $67 million. Delpeuch provided expertise on vineyard management.

None of the châteaus were major names in the U.S. market. Qu bought rundown estates whose owners were eager to sell, wineries that had failed to find consumers in Europe or America but could be rebranded to sell more lucratively in the burgeoning Chinese market. At this time, other superwealthy Chinese figures, including Alibaba Group founder Jack Ma, real estate and investment executive Pan Sutong and film star Zhao Wei, were also investing heavily in Bordeaux vineyards.

Qu, who made his fortune in oil trading before diversifying into chemicals, plastics, diamonds, real estate and theme parks, had a far-reaching vision. He sought to tie his hometown, the industrial port of Dalian, with Bordeaux both commercially and culturally. He began construction on an elaborate château-themed residential community in Dalian with a vineyard and a massive cellar to warehouse and sell Bordeaux wine.

The project was announced in 2011 to much fanfare at the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIB), with négociants and city officials from Bordeaux and Dalian in attendance. Qu, who kept a low profile in public, sat in the audience, leaving the photo ops to officials, politicians and consultants.

He also worked to boost wine tourism in Dalian. After witnessing the success of the Hong Kong Wine and Dine Festival, a version of Bordeaux's popular wine festival organized in conjunction with the CCIB, CIVB, the Bordeaux Tourism Office and various wine-related promotional associations, he contacted the CCIB and invited them to do the same thing in Dalian.

China’s Politics Change, Bringing Trouble

The organization began to have problems after the first festival, and the partnership faltered. Other signs of trouble ensued. Delpeuch distanced himself legally from Qu's estates. According to media reports, labor practices at odds with French law emerged. (Delpeuch told Wine Spectator he only consulted on vineyards and was not connected to château purchasing and finance.)

And then the politics in China changed. Xi Jinping became president in 2013 and soon after began a public war on corruption. Arrests, the confiscation of property, disappearances of known figures and executions followed. While the average income of regular Chinese residents had grown during the country’s economic boom, many of those with close ties to the government were accumulating tremendous wealth.

In 2014, China's powerful National Audit Office (NAO) issued a damning report on companies accused of corruption, saying that Haichang Group and another Dalian-based company diverted 268 million Chinese yuan—more than $30 million at the time—of government funds to purchase Bordeaux vineyards. The funds were officially earmarked for foreign investments in science and technology as part of the Chinese government's push to acquire key foreign assets such as commodities, manufacturing and infrastructure to bolster the Chinese economy. The classification of technology includes agriculture.

No arrest or court case was reported in China, but Qu disappeared from public life. Meanwhile, the audit caught the attention of French investigators at the Direction Interrégionale de la Police Judiciaire in Bordeaux.

Their investigators found offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands and a loan from the Chinese bank ICBC in Paris acquired using forged legal documents. They discovered a number of infractions, which allowed them to seize several of Qu's châteaus in 2018. The Central Office for the Repression of Major Financial Crime joined the case. Investigators also zeroed in on Qu's enablers, the people in France who facilitated the acquisitions. (The authorities said there was no evidence of fraud in the winemaking operations at the châteaus.)

A Shell Game

In 2019, the French government's financial prosecutor's office announced their case. Their targets had narrowed to Qu, a winemaker and Exco Ecaf, a Bordeaux accounting firm formerly headed by Pierre Goguet, chairman of the CCIB.

At the tribunal in Paris in February, the French financial prosecutors revealed a complex labyrinth of shell companies in the British Virgin Islands, evidence of money laundering and other infractions. At least some wineries were owned under the name of Qu’s wife.

In addition to Qu, his employee Jian Liu received a suspended 18-month prison sentence and a roughly $54,000 fine for forgery, the use of false documents and fraud. The accounting firm Exco Ecaf was found not guilty of failure to report crimes to government auditors.

Qu's defense lawyer, Maxime Delhomme, said that they will likely appeal the verdict. His clients, Mr. Qu and Mr. Liu, had been dealt bad luck, he said. With the confiscation of the châteaus, they had been "plucked twice."

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While MEPs urgently called for measures to address disinformation risks and foreign influence attempts before the EU elections, according to a letter dated 9 April and seen by Euractiv, the European Commission responded just two days before the vote, stating the decision lies with tech platforms.

While MEPs urgently called for measures to address disinformation risks and foreign influence attempts before the EU elections, according to a letter dated 9 April and seen by Euractiv, the European Commission responded just two days before the vote, stating the decision lies with tech platforms.

The April letter, addressed to Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager and Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton, was led by the Netherlands’ Kim van Sparrentak (Greens) and Paul Tang (S&D) and signed by 37 other lawmakers from the EPP, Renew, and S&D.

Recommendation systems suggest content users see by using algorithms that tailor experiences based on user profiles and behaviour. The MEPs expressed concern that these systems induce anger and push users towards extremist content, thus heightening the spread of misinformation and demoting high-quality content.

MEPs suggested turning off personalised recommendation systems by default on very large online platforms, including Meta’s Facebook, and stopping such interaction-based algorithms.

The Commission only replied to the letter on 4 June, almost two months after the letter was sent and just two days before the 6-9 June vote. Vestager and Breton said the Digital Services Act (DSA) does not provide a “one-size-fits-approach on risk management concerning recommender systems”, leaving it up to platforms to decide appropriate mitigation measures.

The DSA, in force since February, is a horizontal legislation regulating how online actors should deal with illegal and harmful content online.

The executive is “carefully monitoring VLOPSE’s [Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines] DSA compliance” and in March released a set of guidelines for digital services to mitigate election risks, the Commissioners said.

In their letter, the MEPs only mentioned the DSA to say that their suggested measures could be adopted under its auspices “in guidelines, a reviewed code of practice, as crisis measure or if necessary as new initiatives”. They also did not mention the March guidelines.

The measures MEPs proposed could be adopted by the platforms, but any Commission decision to impose such requirements should be adopted “based on facts and high-quality evidence.”

Despite what the Commissioners wrote, platforms may soon face stricter rules to limit disinformation.

Efforts are underway to make the currently voluntary anti-disinformation charter a mandatory Code of Conduct under the DSA, Vice President Věra Jourová recently told Politico.

The Commission also mentioned the proceedings against X and Meta for suspected regulation violations.

A Russian court has ordered the seizure of 51.8 million euros ($56 million) of assets from Germany's Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg (LBBW), court filings showed, in a lawsuit related to an aborted gas project.

LBBW, which declined to comment, was one of the guarantor lenders under a contract for the construction of a gas processing plant in Russia with Germany's Linde, which was terminated due to Western sanctions.

When the project was halted, St Petersburg-based RusChemAlliance, a joint venture that is 50% owned by Russian gas giant Gazprom, had made a 2 billion euro advance payment on the 10 billion euro contract, according to Britain's Supreme Court website.

RusChemAlliance has filed similar suits against Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Italy's UniCredit.

The court hearing just ended. The attacker was a Polish guy who was blackout intoxicated by alcohol and drugs during the incident. He is known by local police from previous episodes in which he has been mentally "unhinged". He does not recall the episode other than being positively thrilled to meet the prime minister. He was ashamed of his actions.

via https://feddit.dk/comment/8705595

Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Germany would only support European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for a second term if her center-right European People’s Party can build a stable majority in the next European Parliament without support of the far right.

“A commission president must always rely on the democratic parties of Europe, on a platform including the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the Liberals,” Scholz said at an event of his center-left Social Democrats in Berlin. “There must not be any far-right or right-wing populist parties.”

Europe’s far-right parties are aiming for gains in elections to the European Parliament that kick off on Thursday. A significant rightward tilt would thrust migration to the top of Europe’s political agenda in the coming years, and complicate progress on the bloc’s ambitious climate agenda.

Von der Leyen, a German, has suggested a possible shift to the right by signaling she’s open to working with parts of the European Conservatives and Reformists group, which includes Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

The top candidate of the center-left European Socialists Party (PES), Nicolas Schmit, told Table Media in an interview that he considers Meloni a nationalist and explicitly warned Von der Leyen against any form of cooperation with Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party.

“Von der Leyen wants us to believe in good ring-wing extremists,” Schmit said. If Von der Leyen tried an arrangement of power with the far right to secure a second term, she would not be able to count on the support of the PES.

The commission’s top job traditionally goes to a member of the political party that wins the most seats in parliament, which is expected to be Von der Leyen’s EPP. But the former German defense minister has alienated a number of key backers during her five-year term.

Scholz, who didn’t name any particular far-right party, said Germany’s history means it has a special responsibility in Europe. This was a key condition and he is “very serious” about this, the chancellor added.

The parliament is the only directly elected European Union institution. The makeup of the top EU jobs is negotiated behind closed doors by the member states and the commission post needs to be approved by the parliament.

The EPP’s Von der Leyen remains the front-runner, but she has made her share of enemies. French President Emmanuel Macron has floated the idea of installing an alternative candidate.

Here is the study.

By Natalia Letki, associate professor, University of Warsaw • Dawid Walentek, Post-Doc, Ghent University • Peter Thisted Dinesen, professor of political science, University of Copenhagen • Ulf Liebe, professor of sociology and quantitative methods, University of Warwick.

- According to our recent research, European citizens are not as polarised on the issue of migration as their governments. Across member states, people have remarkably similar preferences - across all nations, regardless of their age, gender or level of education -, including being strongly in favour of asylum seekers being allowed to work, a joint study by universities in Poland, Belgium, Denmark, and the UK revealed.

- Research looking at preferences for different types of immigrants has shown little to no change in general stance towards refugees and asylum seekers among the European public following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

- After the war in Ukraine broke out, researchers re-interviewed respondents in Germany, Poland and Hungary – countries most exposed to the influx of refugees from Ukraine in our original study – to find that it made Polish and Hungarian citizens even more willing to grant asylum seekers access to the labour market, and slightly more open towards their freedom of movement.

- Researchers say that the results give them "hope that the issue of migration can move from dividing to uniting Europe, and the EU can enact a migration policy that lives up to its values", adding that for this to happen, "politicians across the EU will have to listen to their voters".

The issues of migration and asylum are contentious in Europe, and have caused deep rifts among EU member states for years. These topics are fully on the agenda for the 2024 EU elections. Political parties have taken radically different stances, from proposing to triple the number of staff at Frontex, the EU’s border agency, to dissolving it entirely.

In April, the European parliament passed its pact on migration and asylum, an overhaul of its migration policies nearly a decade in the making. The pact aims to improve immigration and control and asylum policy at the EU’s external borders, and make it easier to return failed applicants to their countries of origin.

It also introduces a number of “solidarity measures”, whereby less burdened nations have to offer support to those receiving a higher load of asylum applications. Finally, it allows asylum applicants to take up paid employment if they are waiting longer than six months for a decision on their application. But critics say it undermines asylum seekers’ human rights by limiting their right to appeal.

Meanwhile, the Polish and Hungarian governments have voted against the pact and declared that they will not ratify it. Both countries and the Czech Republic breached EU law in 2015 by refusing to accept asylum seekers relocated from other member states.

But, according to our recent research, European citizens are not as polarised on this issue as their governments. Across member states, people have remarkably similar preferences, including being strongly in favour of asylum seekers being allowed to work.

We surveyed a total of 18,176 people in ten EU member states (Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Spain and Portugal) about what they expect from migration and asylum policy.

We asked for opinions on a number of elements: control of external EU borders, allocation of asylum applicants among member states, freedom of movement, right to work and the policy cost for the average taxpayer. Respondents were asked multiple times to choose between two different policy packages, in which we randomly varied these aspects.

Respondents were around 17%-18% more likely to choose a policy with either of the options allowing access to the labour market, over a policy with “no right to work”. However, they were not supportive of asylum seekers’ freedom of movement and would prefer them to live in a designated place (respondents were 8.3% more likely to choose the latter option over the former).

Unsurprisingly, we found that most people would like a policy to be inexpensive (respondents were 15% more likely to choose this option over an expensive policy). And, while they would welcome increased protection at EU external borders, this was not of primary importance.

These preferences were shared by citizens surveyed across all nations, regardless of their age, gender or level of education.

Citizens of countries that have experienced a large influx of asylum applicants in the past (Germany, Spain, Austria, Portugal) would like to be able to relocate new applicants to less burdened countries. For those in other countries, the issue of allocation of asylum applicants among member states is only marginally important – people are generally more concerned with domestic policy than EU-wide solutions.

Effect of war in Ukraine

We collected data just before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and followed up in Poland, Hungary and Germany immediately after. We wanted to know whether the strain related to the sudden presence of millions of war refugees changed people’s expectations on asylum policy in the most affected countries.

Within weeks of the Russian invasion, over 6 million Ukrainian refugees crossed into the EU. They were greeted with a massive wave of support and offered special temporary protection allowing them to take up employment and relocate freely within the EU.

Yet, receiving societies experienced considerable strain, with a radically increased demand for social services and growing labour market competition. On the other hand, the proximity of war and cultural similarity of refugees to EU citizens might have made them generally more open towards asylum seekers.

Research looking at preferences for different types of immigrants has shown little to no change in general stance towards refugees and asylum seekers among the European public following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

We re-interviewed respondents in Germany, Poland and Hungary – countries most exposed to the influx of refugees from Ukraine in our original study – to see whether the war led them to change their preferences. Interestingly, we found that it made Polish and Hungarian citizens even more willing to grant asylum seekers access to the labour market, and slightly more open towards their freedom of movement.

While governments may remain divided over these issues, our findings show that European citizens are largely in agreement, supporting a policy of cautious hospitality. This gives us hope that the issue of migration can move from dividing to uniting Europe, and the EU can enact a migration policy that lives up to its values. However, for this to happen, politicians across the EU will have to listen to their voters.

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A Moscow court on Wednesday sentenced Russian blogger Anna Bazhutova to five-and-a-half years in jail for livestreaming witness testimony about alleged Russian atrocities during the occupation of the Kyiv suburb of Bucha.

"It's disgusting and vile. It's messed up," the 30-year-old defendant, speaking from the glass-walled dock, said in reaction to the ruling against her.

The Ostankino district court in northern Moscow found Bazhutova guilty of spreading "fake" information on abuses by the Russian army in Ukraine on her YokoBovich channel on the Twitch livestreaming service.

Russia has waged an unprecedented crackdown on dissent since it launched its military campaign against Ukraine in February 2022.

"This is a harsh sentence. We will appeal," her lawyer Andrei Nevrev said.

Ukraine accuses the Russian army of carrying out a massacre in the town near Kyiv during its retreat from the region in spring 2022. Moscow rejects these accusations and says the massacre was staged by the West.

In April 2022, Bazhutova did a live broadcast including witness statements from people living in Bucha who directly accused the Russian military of carrying out killings.

A recording of the broadcast was republished in June 2023 by bloggers that support Russia's offensive in Ukraine, who filed a complaint against her to police.

Two months later, police came to her home and confiscated audiovisual materials. Her Twitch channel was also blocked.

"We expected a lighter verdict. It's tough, frightening," Bazhutova's partner, Alexander Demchuk, told reporters after the verdict.

"Anna never leaves the house, she suffers from agoraphobia. But she is strong, I hope she will overcome this," he added.

Moscow made criticism of the military illegal shortly after launching its assault on Ukraine and has since detained thousands of opponents.

Russian courts have issued severe punishments for criticism, whether in comments to journalists, in social media or even in poetry.

Alexandra Popova, whose husband Artyom Kamardin was sentenced to seven years in prison last December for reciting a poem, came to Wednesday's hearing to show her support for Bazhutova.

Kamardin had read a poem titled "Kill me, militia man" at a popular protest spot in Moscow in opposition to the Kremlin's September 2022 mobilisation drive.

"I'm not surprised by the verdict, but it's very painful for me," Popova said Wednesday.