- New high-volume 200mm silicon carbide manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy - Projected 5 billion euros multi-year investment program including 2 billion euros support provided by the State of Italy in the framework of the EU Chips Act - Catania Silicon Carbide Campus realizes ST’s plan for fully vertically integrated SiC capabilities from R&D to manufacturing, from substrate to module, on one site, enabling automotive and industrial customers in their shift to electrification and higher energy efficiency

STMicroelectronics, a global semiconductor leader serving customers across the spectrum of electronics applications, announces a new high-volume 200mm silicon carbide (“SiC”) manufacturing facility for power devices and modules, as well as test and packaging, to be built in Catania, Italy.Combined with the SiC substrate manufacturing facility being readied on the same site,these facilities will form ST’s Silicon Carbide Campus, realizing the Company’s vision of a fully vertically integrated manufacturing facility for the mass production of SiC on one site.The creation of the new Silicon Carbide Campus is a key milestone to support customers for SiC devices across automotive, industrial and cloud infrastructure applications, as they transition to electrification and seek higher efficiency.

[...]

The Silicon Carbide Campus will serve as the center of ST’s global SiC ecosystem, integrating all steps in the production flow, including SiC substrate development, epitaxial growth processes, 200mm front-end wafer fabrication and module back-end assembly, as well as process R&D, product design, advanced R&D labs for dies, power systems and modules, and full packaging capabilities. This will achieve a first of a kind in Europe for the mass production of 200mm SiC wafers with each step of the process – substrate, epitaxy & front-end, and back-end – using 200 mm technologies for enhanced yields and performances.

The new facility is targeted to start production in 2026 and to ramp to full capacity by 2033, with up to 15,000 wafers per week at full build-out. The total investment is expected to be around five billion euros, with a support of around two billion euros provided by the State of Italy within the framework of the EU Chips Act. Sustainable practices are integral to the design, development, and operation of the Silicon Carbide Campus to ensure the responsible consumption of resources including water and power.

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- Proposed sanctions target creditors in third countries using SPFS - G7 summit in Italy in June to provide direction on handling frozen Russian assets

G7 countries and the European Union are deliberating potential sanctions against banks in third countries that utilize Russia's System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), an alternative to SWIFT, to circumvent Western sanctions. These discussions are taking place ahead of the G7 summit in Italy this June.

The proposed sanctions target creditors in third countries using SPFS. Although specific measures have yet to be finalized, different countries may adopt varying approaches to these restrictions. The measures are being developed in coordination with the European Union.

SPFS was established as a Russian alternative to SWIFT to ensure the uninterrupted transmission of financial messages domestically and internationally. According to Elvira Nabiullina, President of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 159 foreign participants from 20 countries have already connected to the system.

The European Union is also considering banning the use of SPFS as part of a new package of sanctions against Russia. This move aims to further isolate Russia economically and limit its ability to bypass Western financial restrictions.

Why this matters: The proposed sanctions have significant implications for global financial systems and international relations, as they aim to tighten economic pressure on Russia. If implemented, these measures could lead to further economic isolation of Russia and have a ripple effect on the global economy.

The United States has been particularly vocal about the need to address financial institutions assisting Russia in evading sanctions. An executive order issued by the Biden administration in December threatened punitive measures against such institutions. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell highlighted that the primary focus is on Chinese companies and financial institutions systematically supporting Russia. "There will be steps that are taken not just by the United States but other countries signaling our profound displeasure about what China is seeking to do in its relationship with Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine," Campbell stated.

Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo emphasized that Chinese firms must choose between doing business with Western economies or supporting Russia's war efforts. "Chinese firms can either do business in our economies or they can equip Russia's war machinery with dual-use goods. They can't continue to do both," Adeyemo asserted.

The G7 leaders' summit in Italy next month is expected to provide political direction on how to handle billions of dollars' worth of frozen Russian assets. Adeyemo hopes that progress will be made on seizing these assets, sending a clear message to Russia about the international community's resolve.

The G7 and the EU continue to discuss these potential sanctions, and the broader implications for global financial systems and international relations remain significant. The measures aim to tighten the economic pressure on Russia while addressing the role of third-country banks in facilitating transactions that undermine Western sanctions.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/16030383

All Santander staff and '30 million' customers in Spain, Chile and Uruguay hacked

France has banned Israeli companies from participating in this year’s annual Eurosatory arms and defence industry exhibition in Villepinte near Paris next month, the event’s organisers and the French Defence Ministry said on Friday, Reuters reports.

“Following a decision by government authorities, there will not be an Israeli stand at the Eurosatory 2024 salon,” a spokesperson for the organisers said via email.

The Defence Ministry told Reuters that: “Conditions are no longer met to host Israeli companies at the show at a time when the President is calling for Israel to cease operations in Rafah.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called on Friday (31 May) for NATO members to spend together ‘equitably’, €40 billion a year for Ukraine, giving up on his original multi-year plan, nevertheless assuring this will provide a long-term perspective for Ukraine.

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Here is the study in English (pdf). There is a Hungarian version on website.

If you seek some orientation which political parties belong to which group in the EP, you may find this link to the European Parliament helpful.

Although most delegations from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are highly critical of the Kremlin, China and other authoritarian countries in the European Parliament, there are significant differences among them, a new study published by Political Capital reveals.

The Hungarian institute teamed up with partners to track the views of incumbent MEPs from the Visegrad countries, Austria, Bulgaria and Romania on authoritarian regimes.

While the Polish and Czech mainstream parties are staunch critics of authoritarians in the international and domestic arena, other mainstream parties from Austria, Bulgaria, and Romania are not as committed at home. Some populist radical and far-right parties seem to be close friends of authoritarians. Some parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz, Slovakia’s SMER-SD and Bulgaria’s BSP can be considered “soft defenders”. These parties engage in discourse similar to the far right, but intentionally abstain from voting due to political and reputational risks.--

As the European Parliament’s ninth term (2019-2024) is drawing a close, we can say that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have faced unprecedented challenges from Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reacted to an increasingly assertive China that is now threatening Taiwan openly. While the European Parliament (EP) has no real decision-making power in the field of foreign policy, the interferences of authoritarian states show that their word still matters on the world stage. The alleged cash-for-influence Qatargate scandal, the biggest corruption instance to hit the EU in decades, showcased that authoritarian states are willing to spend resources on buying influence in the Parliament and its committees. Consequently, there is ever-growing value in studying the foreign policy-related votes in the EP.

Although the EP is not able to shape the EU’s foreign policy by itself, it can exert influence over it through its resolutions. Our previous study demonstrated that the MEPs have achieved substantive results in influencing the Union’s foreign policy decisions, such as voting to freeze the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement and approving the Ukraine Facility to help fund Ukraine in its struggle against Russia. The EP can exert more significant influence through the co-decision procedure as its consent or approval is necessary for issues like new EU Member State accession and international trade deals. The incoming MEPs in the next EU Parliament can be at least as influential in shaping the EU’s policies towards third countries as their predecessors were if the critics of authoritarian regimes maintain their substantial majority. Our analysis examines which parties consistently criticize authoritarian countries in the EP, from Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.

Big Picture: Party groups’ attitudes towards the Kremlin, China and other authoritarians

Bulwark against authoritarianism

The majority of MEPs from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are highly critical of the Kremlin, China, and other authoritarian regimes. This CEE “bulwark” against authoritarian countries varies between countries; the mainstream parties from Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Poland and Romania, as well as opposition parties from Hungary and Slovakia, are the toughest on authoritarianism. However, the authoritarian-critical voting stances may reflect concerns with social desirability within the European arena (as well as the convictions of individual MEPs). In Austria, Bulgaria and Romania, domestic party-political stances have pointed to more equivocal dispositions towards authoritarian regimes over time due to geopolitical positions and political and economic goals.

The Czech and Polish mainstream parties are the regional strongholds against authoritarian states. The Polish society and the whole political class share deep-rooted anti-Kremlin sentiment that transpires into the Polish MEPs' behavior in the EP. None of the Polish MEPs voted against any of the Russia-related votes. The ruling coalition parties and the Law and Justice (PiS, ECR) also united against Beijing due to widespread anti-communist and pro-American sentiments. Similarly, the Czech ruling coalition parties and the largest opposition party, ANO (RE), are jointly committed to critical stances towards authoritarianism. Czech MEPs continue to follow the value-based tradition of Vaclav Havel's diplomacy, which underscores the protection of human rights. At the same time, ANO has diverged from this strong Kremlin critical behavior and willfully spread anti-Ukrainian narratives at home. While Czech politicians show signs of pragmatism in relations with China, they do not shy away from condemning the country for its human rights violations in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang, underlying that human rights are pre-conditions for engaging in trade and investment.

Although Austrian, Bulgarian and Romanian parties tend to support resolutions against the Kremlin, China, and other authoritarian countries in the EP their domestic representatives are not as committed to a staunch critical stance. There is a substantial disparity between domestic and international discourse. While the MEPs of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP, EPP) condemn authoritarians along with the rest of the mainstream parties in the EP (Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ, S&D), Greens (Greens/EFA), and the New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS, RE)), the ÖVP-led government engaged in a more pragmatic discourse at home and even blocked Kremlin critical initiatives within the EU institutions. Similarly, Romanian MEPs are more in with the open criticism of Moscow and Beijing than domestic representatives. Likewise, the conservative Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB, EPP) and the liberal Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS, RE) consistent alignment with critical attitudes towards Russia and China in the EP may be hollow. GERB’s and MRF’s strict adherence to critical resolutions on the surface may hide their deep-seated attitudes and behaviors favorable to Russian and Chinese interests.

Opposition parties from Slovakia and Hungary generally support resolutions that condemn the policies of authoritarian states. The Slovak MEPs from center and center-right parties (Progressive Slovakia (PS, RE), Christian Democratic Movement (KDH, EPP)Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO, EPP), Freedom and Solidarity (SaS, ECR), Democrats (former Spolu-OD, RE) have sharply critical attitudes towards authoritarian regimes. While Hungarian opposition MEPs (Democratic Coalition (DK, S&D), Momentum (RE), Jobbik-Conservatives, Independent) show resistance to authoritarianism, they miss numerous votes compared to Western parties. One notable figure here is István Ujhelyi, who missed 73% of the votes concerning China, likely exhibiting a “soft defense” strategy towards China. The DK and the Jobbik-Conservatives have become critical of Russia in the past few years as these parties used to have close ties with the Kremlin: DK leader Ferenc Gyurcsány pursued a very pro-Russian foreign policy line as prime minister before 2009, while the then-extremist Jobbik party promoted the Kremlin’s policy goals and legitimized the Russian regime before the party’s mainstream turn starting around 2016.

Friends of authoritarians

There are some parties from the CEE that seem to be lenient towards authoritarians. These are mostly extremist fringe parties such as the Freedom and Direct Party (SPD, ID), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM, The Left) from Czechia, and the Slovak Republic Movement (Republika, Independent) and the Slovak Patriot (Independent). The only exception is the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, ID), which has been leading the polls in Austria. These parties can be deemed as the main entry points for authoritarian regimes to influence EP resolutions, although their aggregated weight is too low for any chance of success.

The FPÖ has cultivated a notoriously friendly relationship with the Kremlin and even signed a “friendship” agreement with the Russian ruling party, United Russia, in 2016. The FPÖ MEPs failed to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in key votes and statements. For instance, they voted against establishing the Ukraine Facility. The party also questioned the EU sanctions levied on Russia and called for a referendum on the matter in Austria. The leader of the FPÖ delegation, MEP Harald Vilimsky, stressed that a “small clique of EU-centralists is endangering our prosperity and freedom” with these sanctions.

Soft defenders of China and Russia

Some parties are "soft defenders" of Russia and other authoritarian regimes. We can call the strategy of the Hungarian right-wing Fidesz (Independent), the left-wing Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, S&D) and Direction – Slovak Social Democracy (Smer-SD, Independent) on foreign policy votes as "soft defense"; meaning that frequently, these parties seem to miss votes deliberately to avoid having to condemn authoritarian regimes. Notably, the parties’ representatives engage in a discourse similar to that of far-right parties such as the FPÖ, while withdrawing from the voting process, presumably out of concern for the geopolitical risks and reputational costs of openly supporting Russia and China.

The Fidesz MEPs seem to intentionally abstain from voting, which condemns countries that are friendly to the Hungarian government. They missed more votes on issues relevant to Russia than the number of Kremlin-critical votes they cast. They voted critically on Russia 194 times altogether but failed to cast any vote 220 times. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the MEPs abstained more often and even started to vote against resolutions condemning the Kremlin. Alarmingly, they failed to vote on a resolution condemning Russia for its unprovoked, unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus' alliance with Russia, on the occasion of the anniversary of the invasion. As a consequence of this strategy, Fidesz falls between the attitude of ECR and ID concerning Russia and China. Depending on whether Fidesz ends up in ID or ECR after the 2024 EP election determines whether the party openly becomes a friend of authoritarians or engages in a slightly more critical stance.

Like Fidesz, a distinctive pattern emerges in BSP MEPs' voting behavior: the non-participation or abstention from voting on resolutions that condemn authoritarian states' actions. The BSP MEPs voted against Russia-related resolutions 15 times, abstained 16 times and failed to cast any vote 111 times. Consequently, the MEPs can conceal and subdue their Russia-friendly stances via non-voting while supporting a few resolutions that condemn the most outrageous Russian interferences. While they supported the resolution on Russian aggression on Ukraine in 2022, they abstained from voting on the resolution that marked one year of Russia's war against Ukraine. Although BSP MEPs showed a tougher stance against China, they did not participate in Beijing's critical resolutions 40 times and abstained 10 times. The party's behaviour calls into question the extent to which the BSP – the formal successor to the Bulgarian Communist Party- integrated pro-Western and democratic values. The party continues to be divided between pro-Russian traditionalist-nationalist and pro-European fractions.

Although Smer-SD MEPs showed a more critical attitude towards authoritarianism than Fidesz and BSP, they frequently abstained in relevant votes and voted against pro-democratic resolutions. In October 2023, the party’s membership was suspended in the S&D group due to SMER-SD MEPs coalescing with the radical right. Smer-SD MEPs voted against the Report on the direction of EU-Russia political relations that strongly criticised Russia. The MEPs portray Russia as a reliable international partner and a friendly state in key debates. Growing threat in the next term

The CEE bulwark against authoritarianism may weaken in the EP after the upcoming 2024 elections. Extremist parties like the FPÖ stand to gain more EP seats, while new far-right and pro-Kremlin ones, such as the Hungarian Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) and the Bulgarian Revival (Vazrazhdane), are likely to join the Parliament. Along with the deterioration of the mainstream parties, these far-right parties will certainly erode the EP’s resolve against authoritarian regimes, as there will be more entry points for authoritarian countries to influence the decision-making. However, it remains unlikely that these parties will be able to turn the EP into a dovish body from its current hawkish foreign policy approach.

Additionally, there should be cause for alarm in the Council of the EU. Fidesz, Smer-SD, BSP and, to a lesser extent, ÖVP seem to be very lenient toward authoritarian countries. Fidesz, Smer-SD and ÖVP are the ruling parties in their respective countries. Thus, the Kremlin’s, China’s or other malign regimes’ interference can be reflected in EU policies via these parties through their work in the Council. Meanwhile, BSP remains the main opposition party in Bulgaria.

Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said on Friday that Washington and the European Union must deliver a message to China that its firms face a choice between doing business with U.S. and EU economies or equipping Russia with dual-use goods.

It had to be made clear that "Chinese firms can either do business in our economies or they can equip Russia's war machinery with dual-use goods. They can't continue to do both," he said in a speech on a visit to Berlin.

Adeyemo said every country in the coalition that imposed sanctions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine and every country in NATO must communicate to Beijing that it is unacceptable for China to abet Russia's military-industrial base. "Let's make clear to Chinese companies that we are all prepared to use our sanctions and export controls to hold them accountable," he said.

President Joe Biden's administration has stepped up messaging about China's support for Russia and issued an executive order in December that threatened sanctions on financial institutions helping Moscow skirt Western sanctions.

Russia last year imported $5.2 billion worth of sensitive, dual-use goods - which can be used for both civil and military purposes - from China-based suppliers, Adeyemo said, marking an increase of more than 40%.

President Vladimir Putin has the capacity to prop up Russia's war economy for years, he said.

"No other country, despite what China would tell us, has the capacity to supply Russia with the quantity of machine tools, microelectronics, engine parts and other goods the Kremlin needs to build its weapons of choice," he said.

"Beijing may not be sending tanks and missiles to Russia but the Kremlin cannot produce these weapons at scale or continue its war without assistance from companies and financial institutions in China."

Adeyemo warned that failing to convince China to stop selling dual-use goods to Russia poses a significant threat to Europe's national security, adding that Putin was confident that he could challenge NATO.

Many of the goods from coalition countries still being found in Russian military equipment are largely being transhipped through China, he said.

Adeyemo's warning comes after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell on Wednesday accused China's leadership of supporting Russia's war in Ukraine and warned that Beijing could face further sanctions in response.

On Tuesday, White House Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economics Daleep Singh said the U.S. and its partners were prepared to use sanctions and export controls to prevent China-Russia trade that threatens their security.

Case for Russian asset seizure

At a Q&A in Berlin, Adeyemo was asked about Raiffeisen Bank, which has come under heavy criticism as the largest Western lender still operating in Russia.

Without mentioning the Austrian bank by name, Adeyemo said the vast majority of banks were complying with the sanctions on Moscow and that, in the few cases where there were concerns, they were being addressed directly with the banks.

He also hoped that a leaders' summit of the Group of Seven (G7) wealthy industrialised nations in Italy next month would provide political direction on how best to use billions of dollars' worth of frozen Russian assets.

"We think there is a case for seizure. There are some who didn't think that that was the best way to go," he said, adding that countries were starting to make progress on which options to take.

"And it will send a clear message to Russia that they can't outlast us, that ultimately, we are committed to economically supporting Ukraine both through our countries, but also using our ability to unlock the value of these frozen assets in some way to continue to support the Ukrainian people as well."

The UK's Labour Party deselected Faiza Shaheen as a candidate for the marginal London seat of Chingford and Woodford Green over a series of social media posts which expressed support for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS), praised former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, and backed candidates running for the Green Party, among other issues, Middle East Eye has been told.

According to the earliest post, a now-deleted tweet from 25 March 2014, Shaheen liked an announcement from environmental economist Griffin Carpenter that he was deciding to stand as a Green Party candidate for Hackney Council.

A second was from 3 August 2014, during Israel's six-week war on the Gaza Strip, where an X user calling himself Rod Dixon shared a message in support of boycotting Israeli goods, and argued that the tactic worked against apartheid South Africa.

One of the more recent posts she liked, and which was flagged by the NEC, was from 12 May 2024, where Philip Lemoine, a PhD candidate and writer at the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology (CSPI), said: "Every time you say something even mildly critical of Israel, you're immediately assailed by scores of hysterical people who explain to you why you're completely wrong, how you’re biased against Israel.

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On 21 May, a St. Petersburg court sentenced 77-year-old scientist Anatoly Maslov to 14 years in prison for treason. A leading global specialist on hypersonic physics with an illustrious career, Maslov had already spent two years in an FSB isolation unit while prosecutors prepared the case against him for allegedly sharing details of Russia’s hypersonic weapons programme with a foreign government. Maslov has always maintained that the charges against him are baseless. Should he live to see the end of his sentence he will be 90 years old.

Several of Maslov’s colleagues at Novosibirsk’s Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics have also been arrested. In 2021, the FSB detained 73-year-old scientist Alexander Kuranov for sharing state secrets with foreign intelligence services at a Russian-American research symposium in St. Petersburg. Kuranov admitted guilt, was sentenced to seven years in a maximum-security penal colony, and is believed to have testified against Maslov.

In 2022, 56-year-old Alexander Shiplyuk was detained and transferred to a detention facility in Moscow for allegedly sharing classified hypersonic research at a conference in China, while Valery Zvegintsev, a 79-year-old hypersonic aerodynamic specialist, was detained by the FSB and placed under house arrest in 2023 for an article he wrote for an Iranian science journal. Both are currently awaiting trial.--

The summer of 2022 saw three leading Russian scientists arrested one after the other. Perhaps the most dramatic case was that of Dmitry Kolker, a laser physicist who was arrested while battling stage four pancreatic cancer in hospital. Forcibly removed from his bed and flown to Moscow’s notorious Lefortovo Prison, Kolker died two days later.

Maslov himself was detained that July in the city of Novosibirsk, where he worked as chief researcher at the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, part of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Maslov’s research focus was gas dynamics, and his discoveries were instrumental in the development of hypersonic weapons — weapons which travel many times faster than the speed of sound.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) said it had reason to believe that Maslov had passed secret hypersonic weapons research to German intelligence in 2014. While very little is known about the case, it appears that the FSB found out about the alleged transfer of classified documents eight years after it occurred. Due to the state secrets involved, his trial was conducted behind closed doors.

State prosecutors requested Maslov be given a 17-year sentence in a high-security prison colony, something Maslov’s defence team baulked at, given that the 77-year-old had already suffered a heart attack during his two-year stint in pretrial detention, and argued that their client would be unable to serve a sentence of even half that duration.

Given Vladimir Putin’s pride that Russia’s hypersonic weapons are currently the best in the world, it’s perhaps unsurprising that researchers working in the field have borne the brunt of his paranoia.

Maslov’s defence lawyer argued a crime could not possibly have taken place, as even if Maslov had passed on the information he was charged with sharing, it wasn’t classified — a fact the FSB appears simply to have ignored. In a prepared statement, Maslov stressed that he had dedicated his entire life to his family and to the national science programme and categorically denied any wrongdoing.

Yevgeny Smirnov, a lawyer for First Department, a legal advocacy group that specialises in closed trials, described the sentence as part of the “trend towards harsher punishments” in the Russian judicial system since the war in Ukraine began. He said that the 14 years Maslov had received was “perhaps a record” for a sentence given to a scientist and added that “the worsening trend in cases brought against scientists accused of treason is in line with the general trend for anyone charged with threatening national security”.

Asked about Maslov’s chances of surviving a prison sentence of such a length, Smirnov struck a surprisingly practical tone. “In this case, you know, everything depends very much on the person, on the support they receive, and on the penal colony they end up in. I don’t know where Maslov will serve his sentence; he will only be transferred after his appeal,” Smirnov continued. “But again, he’s 77 years old, and he has spent two years behind bars. According to his lawyers, his health has deteriorated during that time. And a sentence of 14 years, I’m afraid, may become a life sentence, just taking into account average life expectancy in Russia and the medicine available to prisoners.”

While Smirnov acknowledged that Maslov’s case had gone on for so long because the defence team hadn’t given up hope, he also said that treason charges were very rarely overturned.

But Maslov is not the only scientist in his field to have been prosecuted. Eleven Russian specialists in hypersonic technology have been convicted of treason since 2015. Given Vladimir Putin’s pride that Russia’s hypersonic weapons are currently the best in the world, it’s perhaps unsurprising that researchers working in the field — three of whom have died while awaiting trial — have borne the brunt of his paranoia.

Indeed, several of the Russian hypersonic researchers responsible for the country’s global preeminence in the field are now languishing in prison or are awaiting their fate in pretrial detention. Many were involved in Transhyberian, an officially sanctioned collaborative research project with the EU, according to scientific journal T-Invariant.

“We are not only afraid for the fate of our colleagues. We simply don’t know how to continue doing our job.”

Moscow State Technical University professor, Vladimir Lapygin, 74, was the first to be arrested and charged with passing state secrets to China. Though Lapygin insisted he was innocent, he was found guilty and sentenced to seven years in a high-security penal colony in 2016, and was recognised as a political prisoner by Russian human rights organisation Memorial, which described him as a victim of “spy-mania designed to support the image of ‘a Russia encircled by enemies’ created by state propaganda”.

In 2018, 75-year-old scientist Viktor Kudryavtsev was arrested for allegedly passing classified information to the Belgian Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics, where the Transhyberian project was based. A year later, the FSB arrested Roman Kovalyov, also for allegedly passing classified Russian hypersonic research to the Von Karman Institute. While Kudryavtsev maintained his innocence, Kovalyov pleaded guilty and testified against Kudryavtsev after allegedly being pressured by FSB investigator Alexander Chaban. However, in a tragic turn, the two scientists were subsequently diagnosed with cancer and both died shortly after being released for treatment.

In 2020, scientist Anatoly Gubanov was imprisoned for allegedly sharing reports containing Russian state secrets to his supervisor on another international hypersonics project HEXAFLY-INT. According to his lawyer, Gubanov was subjected to intense psychological pressure by investigators in the run up to his admission of guilt and his eventual decision to make a plea deal.

Six months after Gubanov’s arrest, it was the turn of Russia’s leading hypersonic aircraft specialist Valery Golubkin to be prosecuted. The charges he faced also related to HEXAFLY-INT, though Golubkin maintained his innocence and was sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security penal colony, where he is currently awaiting his appeal hearing. In an unexpected turn of events, however, Gubanov ultimately broke the terms of his deal and refused to give evidence against Golubkin in court, meaning that he too was then sentenced to 12 years in a high-security penal colony.

In 2021, the FSB detained 73-year-old scientist Alexander Kuranov for sharing state secrets with foreign intelligence services at a Russian-American research symposium in St. Petersburg. Kuranov admitted guilt, was sentenced to seven years in a maximum-security penal colony, and is believed to have testified against Maslov.

And still the arrests continue. In December, Vladislav Galkin, an associate professor on hypersonic technologies at Tomsk Polytechnic University was detained in Novosibirsk and is currently awaiting trial.

Several more of Maslov’s erstwhile colleagues at Novosibirsk’s Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics have also been arrested. In 2022, 56-year-old Alexander Shiplyuk was detained and transferred to a detention facility in Moscow for allegedly sharing classified hypersonic research at a conference in China, while Valery Zvegintsev, a 79-year-old hypersonic aerodynamic specialist, was detained by the FSB and placed under house arrest in 2023 for an article he wrote for an Iranian science journal. Both are currently awaiting trial.

In 2023, after yet another arrest, researchers at the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics published an open letter to the Russian authorities in which they stressed the patriotism of Maslov, Shiplyuk and Zvegintsev. The letter also suggested that the men had been prosecuted for sharing research with the wider international community, which they said was considered “an obligatory component of conscientious and high-quality scientific activity”.

The authors of the letter, which is no longer available online and to which the authorities have not replied, went on to say that: “We are not only afraid for the fate of our colleagues. We simply don’t know how to continue doing our job.”

The silence from the wider Russian scientific community has been deafening, however, with no other institutes or organisations making public statements of support for the scientists implicated in the Novosibirsk treason cases. Indeed, for now, the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics appears to be the sole body unafraid to speak up for its persecuted colleagues.

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Hungary’s government signed an accord with Belarus to help build Hungary’s second nuclear plant, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said in a statement in Minsk on Wednesday (29 May).

Hungary’s PAK 2 reactor has been under construction by Russia’s Rosatom since 2014. The Russian company is building two reactors with a capacity of 1.2 gigawatts each at PAKS 2 in central Hungary.

“Of great importance is the agreement signed here today on nuclear energy cooperation, which allows us to use the experiences Belarus gained here while constructing reactors with a similar technology,” Szijjártó said, without giving further details on the accord.

The €12.5 billion project has experienced long delays, even though nuclear power is not covered by European Union sanctions against Russia, imposed over the war in Ukraine.

Hungary, which gets most of its power from Russia, has opposed expanding sanctions to include the sector.

Belarus is not only under EU sanctions, it is also under diplomatic isolation, Szijjártó becoming the first top official from an EU country to visit Minsk after the West slapped it with sweeping sanctions following the August 2020 presidential election.

The EU does not recognise the results of Belarus’ presidential elections of 8 August 2020 and condemns them as neither free nor fair. It considers that Aleksandr Lukashenko lacks any democratic legitimacy.

Szijjártó also criticised a proposal from some of Hungary’s European and NATO counterparts to send their soldiers to Ukraine to train forces inside the country.

“I am abhorred by the statements that say that EU, NATO countries are sending soldiers to Ukraine,” he said.

European Union defence ministers on Tuesday debated the idea of training Ukrainian forces inside the country but did not reach a common position on the sensitive issue.

The 27-nation bloc already has such a mission for Ukrainian troops, but the training takes place in EU countries.

Hungary’s government has strained relations with Kyiv and has maintained better ties with Moscow than other EU states since Russia’s invasion two years ago.

Hungary will take over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU from 1 July.

At least seven journalists and activists who have been vocal critics of the Kremlin and its allies have been targeted inside the EU by a state using Pegasus, the hacking spyware made by Israel’s NSO Group, according to a new report by security researchers.

The targets of the hacking attempts – who were first alerted to the attempted cyber-intrusions after receiving threat notifications from Apple on their iPhones – include Russian, Belarusian, Latvian and Israeli journalists and activists inside the EU.

Pegasus is considered one of the most sophisticated cyberweapons in the world, and is operated by countries who acquire the technology from NSO. The company says it is meant to be used for legitimate reasons, such as fighting crime. But researchers have documented hundreds of cases in which operators of the spyware, including states inside the EU, have allegedly used it for other purposes, including spying on political opponents and journalists.

Researchers said they could not definitively identify the state or state agency behind the latest hacking attempts, but they said technical indicators suggested the attempts may have been made by the same NSO client. The developments follow a similar report last year that found Pegasus spyware had been used by an operator inside the EU to target Galina Timchenko, the award-winning Russian journalist and co-founder of the news website Meduza.

The investigation into the latest attempted cyber-attacks was conducted by the digital civil rights campaigners Access Now, the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto’s Munk School, and Nikolai Kvantaliani, an independent security analyst.

When it is successfully deployed, Pegasus can hack into any phone, access photos and mobile phone calls, detect a person’s location, and activate a user’s recorder, turning the phone into a listening device.

The company was placed on a blacklist by the Biden administration in 2021. It is also being sued by WhatsApp and Apple, in cases that it has disputed and that are being litigated in US courts.

While Russia might seem to be the most logical possible state behind the latest series of attacks, researchers have focused their attention within the EU and say they do not believe that Russia or Belarus are NSO customers. While Latvia appears to have access to Pegasus, it is not known for targeting individuals outside its borders. Estonia is also a known user of Pegasus and, researchers said, appears to use the spyware “extensively” outside its borders, including in Europe.

One Russian target, a journalist who lives in exile in Vilnius and has decided to remain anonymous due to personal safety concerns, received two Apple threat notifications, with the latest on 10 April 2024, according to the researchers. An analysis of the journalist’s mobile phone confirmed an attempted infection on 15 June 2023. The journalist attended a conference for Russian journalists in exile in Riga, Latvia the next day, focusing on the vulnerabilities facing journalists in the region.

Two Belarusian members of civil society living in Warsaw also received Apple notifications on 31 October 2023. Opposition politician and activist Andrei Sannikov, who ran for the presidency of Belarus in 2010 and was arrested and held by the Belarusian KGB after the poll, had his phone infected on or about 7 September 2021. It was not discovered for two years, he said.

"Even if it is Estonia or Lithuania, or Latvia or Poland, it does not exclude that it is the FSB or KGB [behind it],” Sannikov said. Asked whether the spate of attacks indicated that an intelligence or law enforcement agency within the EU had been infiltrated by Russia or its allies, he added: “Yes of course. It is I think common knowledge that the western institutions are heavily infiltrated and so [are] opposition circles, as well.”

Natalia Radzina, editor-in-chief of the independent Belarusian media website Charter97.org, and winner of the international press freedom award from the Committee to Protect Journalists, was infected with Pegasus twice in late 2022 and in early 2023.

Radzina called the infections a violation of privacy that was reminiscent of previous intrusions in Belarus, where she was politically persecuted and imprisoned by the KGB.

“I know that for many years my absolutely legal journalistic activity can only be of interest to the Belarusian and Russian special services, and I am only afraid of possible cooperation in this matter between the current operators, whoever they are, with the KGB or the FSB,” she said.

Three other journalists living in Riga also received Apple threat notifications: Evgeny Erlikh, an Israeli-Russian journalist; Evgeny Pavlov, a Latvian journalist, and Maria Epifanova, general director of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

NSO, which is regulated by the Israel’s ministry of defence, says it sells its spyware to vetted law enforcement agencies strictly for the purposes of preventing crime and terror attacks. It said it could not confirm or deny the identities of any alleged specific customers, but that it wanted to emphasise that NSO only sells its products to “allies of Israel and the US”.

The company also provided the Guardian with a copy of a letter it had sent to Ivan Kolpakov, the editor-in-chief of Meduza, in response to his letter to the company. NSO’s deputy general counsel Chaim Gelfand said the company was “deeply troubled by any allegation of potential misuse of our system” and said he would immediately review information Kolpakov had provided to him and initiate an investigation “if warranted”. The company could not, he said, substantiate or refute any allegations without additional information.

Gelfand added: “NSO Group is committed to upholding human rights and protecting vulnerable individuals and communities, including journalists who play a crucial role in promoting and protecting these rights.”

Excerpt:

The lawyer based her request on Article 245 (action incompatible with their duties) and Article 247 (serious misconduct) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The case concerned the disclosure of calls and text messages exchanged between von der Leyen and Pfizer’s CEO Albert Bourla through which both parties negotiated vaccine contracts during the COVID-19 crisis.

Following a criminal complaint filed by Frédéric Baldan, a Belgian lobbyist focusing on China-EU trade relations, the Belgian authorities initiated the case in early 2023. Subsequently, the governments of Hungary and Poland joined the lawsuit.

Von der Leyen kept “stubbornly refusing to disclose contracts for the purchase of COVID vaccines [...and] the electronic messages she exchanged with Mr Bourla, CEO of Pfizer", according to the letter which said her actions offended "public morality" and "shatter the legitimate confidence that citizens should be able to have in all members of the European Commission".

The linked article provides further links to media report in several European languages.

- Most political parties in Europe rely heavily on state subsidies, but not in Germany where they get hundreds of millions of euros from private individuals and companies.

- For only three out of every 10 euros European political parties receive from individuals and companies the name of the donor is made public. This means that 660 million euros is unaccounted for.

- Populist, far-right and far-left political parties receive a quarter of all the private funding, showing that with more political power also comes more money. That’s what Follow the Money, in collaboration with newsrooms from across Europe, collected and scrutinised to get a comprehensive insight into how much money goes to political parties in Europe for the very first time.

cross-posted from: https://sopuli.xyz/post/13237965

Europe seeks to emulate NASA’s revolutionary commercial cargo program

- Mugur Isarescu, in office since 1990, to get eighth term - Lawmakers aim for vote on rate-setting panel by end of June

Romania’s Mugur Isarescu, the world’s longest-serving central bank governor, is poised to be confirmed for a new five-year term as lawmakers seek a vote on the extension by the end of June.

Isarescu took over the leadership of the National Bank of Romania in 1990, less than a year after the collapse of Nicolae Ceausescu’s communist regime, and has served for over three decades except for a yearlong stint as prime minister in 1999 and 2000.

The 74-year-old has the backing of the largest parties in parliament to stay on for another term, according to people familiar with the discussion who asked not to be identified as deliberations weren’t public. The vote on Romania’s nine-member rate-setting panel will take place after local and European Parliament elections on June 9, they said.

Isarescu stopped short of confirming his candidacy for an eighth term earlier this month, though said he’d accept an invitation should parliament back him. The governor has been grappling with the highest inflation in the European Union. He’s dialed back expectations of rapid interest-rate cuts, urging the government to rein in a budget deficit forecast at 5% of economic output this year.

Policymakers in Bucharest unexpectedly held the benchmark interest rate at 7% on May 13, defying expectations among most economists surveyed for a 25 basis-point cut.

As part of the parliamentary vote on the panel, Deputy Governor Leonardo Badea is likely to take over the first-deputy role from Florin Georgescu, who will remain on the board, according to those familiar. Ionut Dumitru, chief economist for Raiffeisen Bank Romania and a former head of the fiscal council, has the support for a deputy governor post, replacing Eugen Nicolaescu, they said.

Some of the existing board members, such as Cristian Popa and Csaba Balint, will likely also have their mandates renewed, while presidential adviser Cosmin Marinescu may also join the team, the people said.

Opposition lawmaker Claudiu Nasui confirmed that the vote will take place by the end of June — and his USR party will support Popa for a new term on the central bank’s board.

A spokesman for the central bank declined to comment.